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Abstract
Large-Scale Distributed Storage Systems (LS-DSSs) are at the core of
several Cloud services. These externalized services may run atop multiple ad-
ministrative domains. While a client may trust the organization that provides
a given Web service, a single server may belong to another organization that
the client does not trust. The design of a Distributed Storage System is itself
a challenging task, in particular when scalability, availability and consistency
are required.
This thesis explores three important aspects within this context: anonymity
and trust in LS-DSSs, auditing for Large-Scale Distributed Aggregation Sys-
tems (LS-DASs), and the evaluation of Distributed File Storage Service
(DFSS) prototypes. The three systems proposed are evaluated using proto-
type implementations.
We present SPADS, a system that provides publisher anonymization and
rate limitation to any generic LS-DSS over a Distributed Hash Table (DHT),
running on unreliable and untrustworthy peers.
Then, we propose CADA, a system that sits on top of a generic LS-DAS,
and detects when one or several servers attempt to bias an aggregation. The
system performs probabilistic auditing, and raises suspicions based on the
statistical deviation from an expected behavior.
Finally, we study DFSSs. Performing a fair comparison of the File System
Consistency Levels (FSCLs) as supported by existing DFSSs is diﬃcult
because these systems feature diﬀerent base performance and optimization
levels. We make an empirical comparison of these FSCLs by instantiating
them into a novel DFSS testbed named FlexiFS.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context
Distributed Storage Systems can be present nowadays in any type of network
service. With the ever-growing exchange of digital information (e-mail, photos,
videos, etc.), the needs for storage capacity increase almost at an exponential
rate.
According to a study done by Martin Hilbert and Priscila López [58],
the world’s storage capacity in 2007 was 295 optimally compressed exabytes
(295 billion gigabytes). Moreover, globally stored information perceived a
23% annual increase, general-purpose computing capacity grew 58% and the
capacity for bidirectional telecommunication grew 28%. Another survey by
Gantz and Reinsel [49] estimates that by 2015, there will be 7.9 zettabytes (7.9
trillion gigabytes) stored, and, thanks to the increasing use of cloud services,
nearly 20% of this data (1.4 zettabytes) will at least go through some cloud
service, and around 10% (0.8 zettabytes) will be stored and maintained in
the cloud.
Distributed Storage Systems have been a subject of research since the
introduction of early systems like XDFS, Swallow, CMU-CFS and Cedar
during the 70s [110]. These systems already explored issues such as naming,
concurrency control and caching. LOCUS [102,126] was the ﬁrst system to
propose location transparency to relieve the client of handling data location,
and high availability through replication. These two concepts are still present
in modern Distributed Storage System designs.
In general, a Distributed Storage System must address the following
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challenges:
Permanent storage: availability of the data stored in such systems must not
be impacted by temporary hardware failures, and persist until explicitly
eliminated. A way to mitigate failures is through replication, which
introduces challenges on its own.
Location transparency: the location of the data within the system should
be completely hidden to the user; the user must not deal with data
location.
Consistency: since data is usually replicated across the system, it is neces-
sary to ensure that replicas are updated in a consistent way.
Availability: nowadays, many Web services rely on Distributed Storage
Systems. These Web services require high availability of the data. Ideally,
a Distributed Storage System should still provide the required data in
spite of server crashes or hardware failures.
Performance: like other computing systems, Distributed Storage Systems
aim for high performance. The performance of a Distributed Storage Sys-
tem can be measured using diﬀerent metrics, such as latency, throughput,
CPU and memory usage.
Security: a Distributed Storage System is typically accessed by many users,
and it is often required that some data is accessible to some users, but not
to others. Sometimes, a user requires that the system does not disclose her
identity. Security is an important issue, and techniques as authentication,
encryption, anonymization and auditing are commonly leveraged in such
systems.
Scalability: scalability is a concept with no general accepted deﬁnition [59].
However, a common way to describe a scalable distributed system is a
system that keeps acceptable service guarantees under large, increasing
amount of load. This load can be a large amount of data, a large amount
of concurrent users, or both. In order to achieve scalability, designers
make a big emphasis on decentralization and parallelization.
This thesis focuses on the security, consistency and availability aspects
of Distributed Storage Systems. We give a high-level deﬁnition of the three
scenarios that are the focus of the thesis:
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Large-Scale Distributed Storage System (LS-DSS) is a network of hun-
dreds of servers or more, which serve thousands of clients that can store
and retrieve data from the system. Data is stored in a distributed manner
across the network.
Large-Scale Distributed Aggregation System (LS-DAS) is a speciﬁc
case of an LS-DSS, where data is aggregated before storage.
Distributed File Storage Service (DFSS) is another speciﬁc case of an
LS-DSS, where data on the cloud can be perceived as a collection or
collections of ﬁles.
LS-DSS is the most generic scenario, and it is the focus of the ﬁrst part
of the thesis. Examples of large-scale storage can be found in the context of
social networks (e.g., Facebook, Google+, Twitter), media sharing portals
(e.g., Instagram, YouTube, Dailymotion, Vimeo, Mega), and other large-scale
internet services, such as Wikipedia and Amazon.
A delicate topic that surrounds internet nowadays is the protection of
privacy. Privacy is the interest of an individual in keeping control on who can
have access to some information about her. This deﬁnition will be further
discussed in Section 4.2.
Major internet companies like Facebook and Google have often faced
concerns because of their use of private information as their core business [3,
27, 40, 60, 116, 117]. These concerns have led to the creation of alternative
projects that take care more about privacy, e.g., the social networks Diaspora
and Friendica [22,47,56,68,119].
One of the most basic ways to maintain privacy is through conﬁdentiality,
which can be guaranteed through the use of encryption and digital certiﬁcates,
to avoid well-known attacks like man-in-the-middle and phishing. Sometimes,
systems must go further and oﬀer other guarantees such as internet anonymity.
In an anonymous transaction, the data being exchanged cannot be associated
with any particular individual. This concept will be explained in detail in
Section 4.2. An approach to achieve anonymity is the use of pseudonyms
(e.g., in email services, chat rooms, login to webpages, where they can be
called also “alias”, “login name”, “nickname”, etc.).
Achieving anonymity is a diﬃcult task, because even when the data has
been “cleaned” (so it cannot be associated with any person), the correlation
of this data with other data set can provide traces of identity. This occurred
to America Online (AOL) in 2006. AOL Research released in a website a
3
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compressed text ﬁle containing several millions of search keywords from over
650,000 users. This dataset was oﬀered for research purposes. Although they
did not show the identity of the users in the report, identiﬁable information
was present in many of the queries, and all queries were associated with AOL
user accounts, identiﬁed numerically. The New York Times cross referenced
the “anonymized” records and phonebook listings, and they managed to locate
an individual. AOL acknowledged later that it was a mistake and removed
the data [9, 55].
LS-DAS is the focus of the second part of the thesis. Several large-scale
distributed applications rely on the aggregation of information as a central
component. Examples of such applications include monitoring, feedback
aggregation [42], search mechanisms [17,95], trust management [131], or popu-
larity tracking and monitoring [18, 84]. We do not consider e-voting systems;
in these systems, security requirements demand for dedicated infrastructures
and strong security enforcement.
A simple example of the use of distributed aggregations is the tracking
of the popularity of the content of a media streaming application (e.g.,
music streaming: Spotify [72], Pandora [99], Deezer [34], or video streaming:
Netﬂix [97], XBOX Video [127]), which can be implemented in a decentralized
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) manner. A similar mechanism could be used in the same
streaming applications to support streaming limitation based on the time or
number of items streamed. Other uses of distributed aggregations within this
context are polls. Consider a song of the year poll proposed by such media
streaming applications, or by a social networking site. In any of these cases,
the client can automatically emit insertions to the distributed aggregation
to increment the counter associated with a given entry, in order to push
their favorite option, or to simply inform that they accessed one given item.
Figure 1.1 presents the general mechanism associated with this aggregation.
DFSSs are covered in the third and last part of the thesis. The arrival
of cloud storage services with ﬁle system front-ends for the end-user (e.g.,
Dropbox, iCloud, SkyDrive, Google Drive), and their deep integration with
operating systems have made the consumer-oriented cloud storage a very
important research ﬁeld. Several aspects are essential when it comes to
quality of service and user satisfaction for such services, notably latency and
throughput of operations, and consistency of reads and writes.
4
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Figure 1.1: Principle of an aggregation of <value, counter> pairs at server S for
key k. (Client node C1 sends a request for increment of the value k.B, which is
routed towards the node in charge of the distribution for key k).
SPLAY We leveraged SPLAY [82] and its libraries for the implementa-
tion of the three systems we have developed (see Section 1.3). SPLAY is
a platform that simpliﬁes the prototyping and development of large-scale
distributed applications and overlay networks. It covers the complete process
of distributed system design, development and evaluation.
SPLAY allows developers to create distributed applications in a concise
manner, using the Lua [65] scripting language. These applications are executed
in a safe environment with restricted access to local resources (storage, memory,
network) and can be instantiated on a large set of nodes.
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1.2 Motivation
We introduced in Section 1.1 the current context of our research, and showed
that there is a tendency to store more and more information on the cloud, while
concerns about privacy regarding this information increment progressively.
We have identiﬁed an ever-growing need for mechanisms that protect the
identity of the end user, while preserving the functionality of the underlying
system.
A speciﬁc motivating example of this thesis is the support of collective
search and recommendation mechanisms. The systems created in Chapters 2
and 3 are motivated by the research done in the context of Buzzaar 1, a
project done in collaboration with the EPFL (École Polytechnique Fédérale
de Lausanne). The Buzzaar project proposes to exploit Web searches and
access histories of users, collected from a simple browser extension, in order
to support automatic browsing suggestions. Once collected, histories are
sent to a collaboratively-operated network of aggregation servers. Thereafter,
the information about previous accesses by other users is used to generate
navigation suggestions. These previous accesses take the form of a distribution
of elements for a given query and/or previously accessed element, and are
reﬁned based on the user interests derived from her own previous searches
and accesses.
Buzzaar allows users to collectively create Internet maps, based on a
variety of information derived from their navigation activities: co-occurrence
of visits to Websites (i.e., visitors of some Web resource A have a given
probability of heading to resource B, for instance), frequencies of visits and
co-visits, vector-based representations of the interests of the users based on
their search and querying history, etc.
These maps are an expression of the emerging navigation patterns and
implicit semantic links between Web resources for a given interest context.
They are used by specialists of information retrieval and data representation
to propose new Web navigation and representation tools.
Buzzaar is based on the collaboration of four kinds of entities. Figure 1.2
presents the relation between these entities and the ﬂow of information
between them.
First, clients install in their Web browser a lightweight plugin that deals
with the gathering and pre-processing of browsing activity information. Sec-
1http://www.buzzaar.net
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Figure 1.2: Buzzaar: general principle and ﬂow of information.
ond, the Authentication Authority (AA) is responsible for registering users
to the service, and for ensuring that these users are legitimate, that is, that
they have a valid e-mail address and can answer a challenge-response test
that is notably easy for a human and diﬃcult for a machine (a “captcha”).
This registration is a one-time operation, when the user installs the plugin.
Third, a set of servers are collaborating to propose the service itself: the
storage of user-generated Web activity information, and the computation of
aggregates based on these values. The servers are running a fault-tolerant and
self-organizing Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [87,106,115], with persistent-
storage based on proactive replication. Finally, some external application
servers are allowed by the AA to access the data stored in the DHT and
the result of its aggregation, which are the inputs for the navigation and
representation tools.
Such aggregation system can leverage cloud computing in any of its three
service models: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service
(PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS) [89]. Thus, Buzzaar can be built
upon the addition of rented resources from many diﬀerent organizations and
companies (See Figure 1.3).
The survey by Gantz and Reinsel [49] states that the presence of vir-
tualization is increasing every year, and that in 2010 more virtual servers
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abcd.org
Figure 1.3: Multidomain data storage system.
were shipped than physical servers. This implies that while the client can
fully trust the company or organization that provides the aggregation system
(abcd.org in Figure 1.3), a single server may belong to another organization
or company that is unknown by the client, or even worse, that the client does
not trust.
In this context, only a small level of trust exists between clients and
servers:
• Users trust the system authority for certifying their identity but not for
processing data. Users cannot trust a single server for not disclosing
private information, and should be able to rely on system-wide mecha-
nisms to hide their identity to the servers that will eﬀectively process
their data.
• Servers cannot trust anonymous clients for using the system fairly;
they must rely on certain mechanisms for limiting risks of information
ﬂood and guaranteeing that the information is posted by authenticated
sources.
• A third risk is the possible presence of malevolent servers that may
want to bias the aggregations.
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To mitigate these three risks, we introduce the systems depicted in Chap-
ters 2 and 3. While Buzzaar ﬁts in the description of an LS-DAS (aggregation
system), the solutions provided in Chapter 2 apply to any generic LS-DSS
(storage system).
The third part of the thesis focuses on the comparison of consistency
models on DFSS. Like any distributed storage service, the expected properties
of a DFSS are consistency, availability, and tolerance to partitions. The CAP
theorem [52] states that a distributed storage system can fully support at
most two of these three properties simultaneously. This will be explained in
detail in Section 4.2. Partition tolerance is usually considered essential for
a DFSS, as data centers may be temporarily disconnected in a large-scale
distributed setting and such events must be supported. As a result, developers
of a DFSS usually decide on a trade-oﬀ between availability and consistency.
Historically, DFSS designs have focused on providing the POSIX strong
model of consistency [64]. The need for planetary-scale and always available
services, and thus the shift to geographically distributed platforms and cloud
architectures, has led DFSS designs to focus more heavily on availability
and weaker consistency levels. By introducing caching mechanisms and
the close-to-open semantics, the Andrew File System (AFS) [61] was one
of the ﬁrst systems to oﬀer a consistency level weaker than POSIX. Most
operations in systems such as HDFS [45] or GoogleFS [51] are sequentially
consistent. However, both systems are built around a central metadata server.
Schvachko [112] recently pointed out that this approach is inherently not
scalable because the metadata server cannot handle massive parallel writes
and the physical limits of a central metadata server design hits the petabyte
barrier, i.e., the system cannot address more than 1015 bytes. On the other
hand, ﬂat storage systems like Cassandra or Dynamo [33,74] propose an even
weaker consistency level: eventual consistency. This relieves designers from
the need for a central metadata server.
Some systems [16,31,93] implement a ﬁle system interface on top of an
eventually consistent storage system. However, to the best of our knowledge,
none has gained wide acceptance. Enabling further research on DFSS to
scale and break the petabyte barrier requires developers to understand and
be able to compare systematically the multiple components of a design.
These components include data distribution and replication (and associated
consistency guarantees), request routing, data indexing and querying, or
access control.
Performing a fair comparison of these aspects as supported by existing
9
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DFSS implementations is diﬃcult because of their inherent diﬀerences. Indeed,
these systems propose not only diﬀerent File System Consistency Levels
(FSCLs), but they also feature diﬀerent base performance and optimization
levels, which largely depend on the programming language, environment,
runtime, etc. This interesting topic is the motivation behind the research
done in Chapter 4.
1.3 Contributions
The three contributions of this thesis are:
SPADS: Publisher Anonymization for DHT Storage
First, we present the rationales, design and implementation of SPADS [43],
a system that provides publisher anonymization and rate limitation to any
generic LS-DSS over a DHT, running on unreliable and untrustworthy peers.
Information stored in an LS-DSS can be sensitive and it might be necessary
to protect the client’s privacy. Furthermore, the risk of having the system
polluted by malevolent clients ﬂooding fake insertions is high. SPADS deals
with both aspects. Publisher anonymity is guaranteed by the use of anonymiz-
ing paths between the clients and the aggregation layer. The inﬂuence of
malevolent users is reduced by means of rate limitation, enforced during the
anonymizing routing operation.
SPADS does not require any modiﬁcation to the DHT but simply builds
upon it. We evaluate the system using a real implementation to observe its
scalability, cost, and eﬀectiveness.
CADA: Collaborative Auditing for Distributed Aggrega-
tion
We focus then on the detection of malevolent behaviors from servers par-
ticipating in an LS-DAS. We propose and evaluate CADA [120], which is
composed by oracles that detect when one or several servers are attempting
to bias the aggregation.
These two oracles are lightweight and operate in a decentralized and
autonomous manner. They are based on the nature of the operation performed,
10
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namely the aggregation of counters for a set of values, and consider the
statistical deviation from an expected behavior.
The actual action(s) to be taken by the system once a server has been
suspected are out of the scope of this thesis, and will often be application-
speciﬁc. The CADA oracles are intended to provide the input for an external
mechanism such as a blacklist management service, a trust management layer,
or the triggering of a more generic—but also considerably more costly—strict
protocol auditing mechanism such as PeerReview [53].
FlexiFS: Framework for the Evaluation of Distributed
File Storage Service prototypes
Finally, we depict the construction of a ﬁle system on top of a regular
key/value store with the simple addition of the compare-and-swap primitive,
and present a clear typology of the diﬀerent FSCLs and categorize existing
implementations accordingly. Then, we make an empirical comparison of these
FSCLs by instantiating them into a novel DFSS testbed named FlexiFS [121].
Our testbed is modular and implements a range of state-of-the-art techniques
for the distribution, replication, routing, and indexing of data.
FlexiFS oﬀers the choice of six ﬂavors of FSCLs, plus, the possibility to
tune several aspects about replication (total number of replicas, minimum
number of replicas to write or read, etc.). We performed several benchmarks
with FlexiFS and we discuss in this thesis the results obtained during these
experiments.
1.4 Organization of the thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we present SPADS,
the ﬁrst contribution of our thesis. CADA is presented in Chapter 3. In
Chapter 4 we introduce FlexiFS and we discuss other topics, such as the
integration of the aforementioned systems, improvements done to SPLAY
during the realization of the thesis, and future work. Conclusions are presented
in Chapter 5.
11
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Chapter 2
Anonymity and Trust in
Large-Scale Distributed Storage
Systems
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present the design and implementation of SPADS: Publisher
Anonymization for DHT Storage. SPADS is a system designed in the context
of an Large-Scale Distributed Storage System (LS-DSS) that is composed of
servers, which are organized as a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) and store
data, and clients, which send data to the servers. By using SPADS, an LS-DSS
can provide publisher anonymization and rate limitation to the clients, while
authenticating users in a reliable manner.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, we explain concepts
that are needed for the understanding of our design. In Section 2.3, we present
in more details the considered system model, the underlying Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) layer characteristics, the problem deﬁnition, and SPADS’ provided
guarantees. Section 2.4 gives an high-level overview of the mechanisms
underlying SPADS. These mechanisms are further described in Section 2.5.
We present an evaluation using a prototype of SPADS deployed on a cluster
in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 goes through similar work already done in this
domain. Finally, we summarize in Section 2.8.
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Figure 2.1: DHT ring example.
2.2 Background
Distributed Hash Tables
DHTs are a basic component of the designs depicted in this thesis. A hash table
is a structure used to organize data inside an associative array. Associative
arrays store items with the format < key , value >. In a hash table, the key
is generated by means of a hash function. A hash function is a mathematical
function that maps a variable length data set into a ﬁxed length data set.
The use of hashes gives a very high probability that the key is unique to each
item (hash collisions may happen, but they are very seldom).
A DHT is functionally the same as a hash table, with the addition that,
in a DHT, data is shared between several nodes interconnected through a
network.
Several P2P systems gained popularity during the 90s, with the notable
mention of Napster, Gnutella and Freenet. These systems used centralized or
ﬂooding mechanisms to index data in their networks, which as mentioned in
Section 1.1, aﬀects scalability. A solution to this was the use of DHT within
the context of P2P systems.
The use of DHTs in P2P systems facilitates automatic indexing and
load balancing of the data by leveraging consistent hashing [67]. A common
abstraction for DHT design is to picture the overlay as a “ring” (see Figure 2.1).
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Ideally, nodes are equidistant from each other on the ring, and keys are
asigned to nodes according to the “region” where they fall. This design
presents the advantage that, when a node enters or leaves the network, only
a small range of keys are redistributed. In Figure 2.1 one can see that the
key/value pair < 3 , “hello” > falls into the region that is managed by the
node with ID equals 2.
A common Application Programming Interface (API) for a DHT is detailed
in the work of Dabek et al. [32]:
• put(k, v) inserts an element of value v and key k.
• get(k) returns the value v of the element associated with key k.
• remove(k) deletes the element associated with key k.
In 2001, four diﬀerent approaches to DHTs appeared in academic research:
Pastry [106], Chord [115], CAN [104] and Tapestry [129, 130]. All of these
approaches present multi-hop routing; they assume large-scale networks,
where maintaining a full list of all the nodes is not eﬃcient. In contrast, each
node only knows a sample of the network, and when a node needs to route a
message toward a key, it forwards it to the node that is closest to it, among
the nodes that are in its sample. This process goes on, until the message
reaches the node in charge of the region that contains the key.
We explain brieﬂy these DHT designs.
Pastry Introduced by Antony Rowstron and Peter Druschel, Pastry [106]
is a DHT where nodes are organized as a ring, composed by 128-bit keys.
Node IDs are chosen randomly and uniformly, so nodes who are adjacent in
the ring can be physically distant.
Pastry uses concepts of the Plaxton routing schema [100]. The main idea
is to route a key to the known node with the longest common preﬁx (i.e., all
the bits that are equal, starting by the most-signiﬁcant bit). A Pastry node
holds two tables of possible routes:
• Routing table: Long distance links to other preﬁx realms.
• Leaf table: Numerically close nodes.
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A third table of close nodes based on some metric (e.g., latency) called
“Neighbor set” is also maintained, but it is not relevant to the routing.
When a key must be routed, the Pastry node checks ﬁrst on the leaf table
if the most suitable node is there. If the best match is not found there, it
checks on the routing table the node with the longest common preﬁx.
Several systems have been based on Pastry, amongst them: a P2P storage
system (PAST [38]), a P2P ﬁle system (Pastis [16]), and a publish/subscribe
system (SCRIBE [107]).
Chord Ion Stoica et al., from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
presented Chord [115] in 2001. Keys and node IDs can have values between 0
and 2m − 1, where m is the number of bits of the key space. To “close” the
ring, k = 2m − 1 is followed by k = 0. Consistent hashing is done with the
use of the SHA-1 algorithm.
Each node has a successor and a predecessor. The successor to a node (or
key) is the next node in the DHT ring in clockwise direction. The predecessor
is the next node in counter-clockwise direction. Each node also knows a list
of m special nodes called “ﬁngers”. The ith ﬁnger has ID equal to n+ 2i−1,
where n is the address of the node that keeps the table. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.2.
Chord is the base of the CFS ﬁle system [31].
CAN Content-Addressable Network (CAN) [104] was proposed by Silvia
Ratnasamy et al., from the University of California at Berkeley and AT&T
Center for Internet Research.
Instead of creating a ring (one-dimensional space), routing in CAN is
based on a multi-dimensional space (torus) of virtual logical addresses of the
nodes of the network. According to its virtual address and the one of its
neighbors, each node gets assigned a region in the multi-dimensional space.
A two-dimensional example of this arrangement can be seen in Figure 2.3. In
this ﬁgure, we can see that the key is mapped to the coordinates (0.6, 0.3),
which fall into the region managed by node 5.
When there is a key to be routed, it traverses the zones until it ﬁnds the
one that corresponds to the key’s mapping into the multi-dimensional space.
Then, the node that maintains the zone handles the key.
CAN is the base of an application level multicast mechanism [105] among
other systems.
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Figure 2.2: Chord ﬁngers.
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<(0.6, 0.3), “hello”>
Figure 2.3: CAN two-dimensional example.
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Tapestry Ben Y. Zhao et al., from the Computer Science Division of the
University of California at Berkeley created Tapestry [129,130]. The system
uses a keyspace of 160 bits, where keys are created with the use of the SHA-1
hash function.
Like Pastry, Tapestry leverages the Plaxton algorithm to route messages.
Objects (key/value pairs) in Tapestry have always a root node OR, which is
the responsible node for the object O. The OR is the node with the numerically
closest ID to O. There are four operations provided by the system:
• PublishObject(Og, Aid)
• UnpublishObject(Og, Aid)
• RouteToObject(Og, Aid)
• RouteToNode(N , Aid, Exact)
For all the operations, Og is the GUID (Globally Unique ID) of object
O, and Aid is the Application ID. The ability to keep diﬀerent Aid per node
is similar to having diﬀerent TCP ports per machine. A particular feature
about this API set is that they are not meant to transfer the object to its
root OR; instead, they only serve to create a pointer in OR that indicates
the node that actually holds the object.
When a node S wants to publish that it holds an object O, it sends a
PublishObject message to OR, to announce it. For each of the nodes that
forward this message up to OR, a pointer O → S is stored, indicating that
node S holds the object.
When any node wants to retrieve O, it will send a RouteToObject message
to OR (it is sure that at least OR has a mapping for object O), and as soon as
this message goes through a node that has a pointer to node S, the message
is redirected to S.
UnpublishObject announces that node S no longer holds object O, and
thus, deletes the pointers along the path to OR. RouteToNode is used to
send a message speciﬁcally to node N. The ﬂag Exact is to indicate that the
message must be delivered to the node with the exact ID speciﬁed on the
message, and not to the closest one.
The distributed storage system OceanStore [73] uses Tapestry.
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Onion routing
In Section 1.1 we discussed brieﬂy the concepts of privacy and anonymity.
Privacy is a general concept, not only related to computer science and internet.
Clarke [26] deﬁnes privacy from the philosophical, psychological, sociolog-
ical, economical and political point of view. He also introduces the term
“information privacy”, which is the composition of:
Privacy of personal communications is the interest of an individual in
being able to communicate with other individuals, using various media,
without monitoring of their communications by other persons or organiza-
tions.
Privacy of personal data is the interest of an individual that data about
her is not automatically available to other individuals and organizations,
and that, even when data is possessed by another party, she is able to
exercise control over that data and its use.
There are several levels of information privacy, that are covered by diﬀerent
guarantees (e.g., conﬁdentiality, anonymity). Some systems might want to
enforce anonymity to provide privacy. According to Clarke [25], an identiﬁed
record or transaction is “one in which the data can be readily related to a
particular individual. This may be because it carries a direct identiﬁer of
the person concerned, or because it contains data which, in combination
with other available data, links the data to a particular person.”. On the
other hand, an anonymous record or transaction is “one whose data cannot
be associated with a particular individual, either from the data itself, or by
combining the transaction with other data”.
One way to achieve anonymity is through pseudonyms. As explained
in Section 1.1 with the example of the AOL data leak, sometimes, the use
of pseudonyms is not enough, because several records linked to the same
pseudonym can be correlated and disclose private information.
A large body of distributed applications process or depend on data that
contain user-centric information. This kind of data is usually considered, with
reason, of high sensitivity by users, as it often allows linking to their identity
or contact information and could be used for malevolent purposes, such as
unsolicited targeted advertising. The majority of these applications are based
on the client-server paradigm. The agreement on the conditions of processing
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Figure 2.4: Example of onion routing with 3 layers and return address.
and storage of the sensitive data is a matter of trust given by the user to the
application server.
Systems such as PeerReview [53] can detect modiﬁcations to the distributed
protocol used by a node, based on its interactions (sent/received messages)
with other nodes of the system. Nonetheless, it is impossible to detect that
a node is using the data, and the identity of its publisher, in a non-allowed
manner either internally or as part of another protocol.
As a result, when designing a distributed system that has to process
user-sensitive information, it is unrealistic to ask each user to consider that
no single server will use her sensitive information for other purposes. Instead,
it is necessary to provide the user with a mechanism that allows her to send
the sensitive data that is useful for the system and for other nodes, but at the
same time hides her identity from the servers and other clients participating
in the system. This process is called publisher anonymization. It ensures that
the nodes that will be able to use and process data (and thus, see it in its
clear form) have no mean to derive the identity of the original clients that
produced it (e.g., their IP addresses, usernames).
The use of public key cryptography along a chain of forwarding nodes, in
order to achieve anonymity, was introduced in the early 80s by Chaum [23] in
the context of email anonymization. This technique, called mixes, was later
popularized as part of the onion routing concept.
The scenario is shown in Figure 2.4. Node A wants to send a message to
node B and receive an answer from it, but neither node A nor B wants other
nodes to know with whom their are exchanging messages. The main idea is
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to force the messages to travel through a path of nodes before arriving to the
destination, making it untraceable. To achieve that, the message is encrypted
iteratively with the public keys of the servers along the path. For that matter,
we assume that the network leverages a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [2],
thus, every server has a well-known unique public/private key pair. This is
represented in the ﬁgure by the lower envelopes. Then, the message must
go through the whole path (full-line arrows), in order to reach node B. Each
server along the path decrypts the message with its own key and passes the
result to the next step (like removing layers from an onion, hence the name).
It is only the last server of the path, node B, who can read the original
message.
If A wants to receive an answer from B, it can set another path that
goes from B to A, encrypt the return address with the keys of the servers
along this path (dashed-line arrows), and attach this to the message before
its encryption. This is represented in Figure 2.4 by the upper envelopes and
the addition symbol.
The system provides anonymity by decoupling the plaintext message to
any identiﬁable information of the source, until it reaches the end of the path.
If the paths are composed by f + 1 servers, one can say that the system
guarantees anonymity of the source even in the case up to f servers agree to
pass identiﬁable information (there will always be at least one node along the
path that will drop the identity of the source).
We use in SPADS a variant of this algorithm, which is explained in
Section 2.5.
2.3 Problem deﬁnition: Anonymity vs. Trust
Decentralized data processing and storage systems typically face the problem
of having clients that want to compromise the good operation of the system.
Speciﬁcally, some clients may want to ﬂood the system with a large amount
of fake information in order to corrupt the service given to other clients. For
instance, in a collaborative search mechanism, if the collected information is
used to derive the popularity or appropriateness of some Web pages, some
cheating user may try to forge a non-deserved rank for her Web site by sending
a large set of fake entries linking to it. It is thus necessary to provide rate
limitation of the data inserted by users into the system.
When the system ensures publisher anonymization, it is diﬃcult, if not
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impossible, to deal with the problem of cheating users after the data has been
inserted into the system. Indeed, it is by construction not possible to blacklist
some user, or remove the entries sent by a given user who has been identiﬁed
as a cheater, because the information about the origin of the data is no longer
available. As a result, it is absolutely necessary to propose a rate limitation
mechanism that takes place before the information is actually inserted into
the system. Obviously, this rate limitation mechanism shall not interfere with
publisher anonymization.
Finally, in a distributed setting where users can join or leave the system
at any time, rate limitation is ineﬀective if it only limits the publication rate
of an individual user, but accepts new users without a prior check that they
are legitimate (that is, that the user is a human and not an automatic robot
performing multiple registrations using diﬀerent, automatically generated,
identities). It is thus necessary to ensure that users are properly legitimated
and authenticated by the system prior to allowing them to publish.
We start by a description of the target system and the prerequisites on
which SPADS builds. Then, we further elaborate on the considered threat
model and on SPADS’ guarantees.
System model
We consider a system composed of:
• Clients, that produce some data.
• Servers, that store and process the data from the clients.
• An Authentication Authority (AA), by which clients register and
are certiﬁed as legitimate human users–this authority also controls some
system-wide parameters and authenticates the servers, but does not
process any user data.
• Applications that can access the information stored in the servers.
DHT
The servers are organized in a DHT. SPADS does not require any modiﬁcation
to the DHT itself. The current prototype uses Pastry [106] but SPADS
supports other DHTs like Chord [115] or Kademlia [87]. Clients, applications,
and the authentication authority do not participate in the DHT but know at
least one node that can serve as an entry point to the service, or have means
to obtain a reference to one or several such nodes.
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The DHT shall propose a conventional API, with put(k, v) and get(k)
operations (see Section 2.2). The DHT is itself based on a Key-Based Routing
(KBR) layer and a structured overlay.
Additional DHT mechanisms
First, we assume that the DHT is augmented by a best-eﬀort proactive
replication mechanism (as in CFS [31]) that tries to maintain at all time a
given number of backup copies of all objects stored in the DHT. This allows
to maintain the storage service in case of servers failures.
Second, we assume that servers in the DHT use node ID authentication
(a mechanism also introduced by CFS [31]). A server that wishes to connect
to the DHT must use as its identiﬁer the hash of its IP address, and will not
be integrated in the routing structure if this relation between the ID and the
IP address is not validated. A server, when receiving a connection request
from a new server, send a nonce to the claimed IP address and check that
(1) it gets back an answer with the proper ID and (2) the ID corresponds
to the hash of the IP address. As forging more than a limited number of
IP addresses is a hard task, this mechanism allows to remove the threat of
servers voluntarily inserting themselves in one or several strategic positions
in the DHT as part of an attack.
Third, we assume that only servers have access to the raw put() and get()
interface of the DHT, and not clients. Without loss of generality, we consider
that the links in the DHT are directed.
Cryptographic infrastructure
Each server is associated with a pair of RSA private and public keys. All
public keys are known, and signed, by the AA. The AA plays the roles of a
certiﬁcation authority for the servers and of a Public Key Server (PKS) for
the clients.
A server can communicate its identity only by using a certiﬁcate. The
server ﬁrst needs to get this certiﬁcate signed by the AA when joining the
system, or when its IP address (therefore, its ID) changes. The AA keeps track
of all issued certiﬁcates and ensures that an IP address cannot be associated
with more than one certiﬁcate. The content of a certiﬁcate is as follows:
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Certiﬁcate for a server s
s.addr IP address (determines also its ID in the DHT)
s.pubk public key of the server
[[s.pubk, addr]]AA.privk signature of the certiﬁcate
Clients do not have a public and private key pair. All clients and all servers
know the public key of the AA. It is used for certiﬁcation and authentication
purposes at several stages of the protocol.
Each server knows a set of neighbor servers, and for each of those, it knows
the associated public key. When a new link is created between two nodes,
a handshake protocol takes place resulting in both parties knowing a small
symmetric key on both sides of the link. This key is then used to encrypt the
data using AES before sending it (a checksum is also included to ensure that
the message is valid). Clients do not have an encryption key for the link they
use with the entry point in the DHT, and are restricted to using the SPADS
API extension only.
Threats considered
SPADS considers the following two misbehaviors from clients and servers.
First, some clients are cheaters. These clients (properly authenticated in the
system or not) want to send ﬂoods of fake information to inﬂuence the service
given to other clients. This can happen, for instance, if the user installs a
corrupted plugin, or is infected by an external virus. Second, some of the
servers may be operated by organizations that have an interest in gathering
personal data (e.g., Web site visits, interest representations, search histories)
and associating it with personal identiﬁcation (IP address, username, etc.).
These misbehaving organizations want to use the collected data to generate
unsolicited targeted advertisement, spy on the the Web sites visited by some
particular user, etc. We consider up to f colluding peers, f being a parameter
that can be decided by clients at each insertion. The authentication authority
is considered correct.
Note that we do not consider servers to be potential cheaters, or if they
are, we do not consider that dealing with them is the role of SPADS. This is
covered later in Chapter 3. Indeed, servers are already part of the DHT and
as such have access to the unprotected put() operation, which they can use to
directly insert fake data. Such a server protocol misbehavior can be detected
by other servers using external means such as PeerReview [53], where the
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server’s external actions (message logs) are reviewed by some other witness
servers against the protocol description. As the generation ex nihilo of new
put() requests is not linkable to some incoming request by a client (which
would have been received by routing from another server), it will fail the
review. Similarly, the node ID authentication mechanism ensures that a node
cannot insert itself at a position in the DHT keyspace where it could take
the responsibility of the element it wishes to promote (and reply with fake
values to get() operations).
Guarantees
SPADS provides the following guarantees to clients and servers of the system,
and, by extension, to the application servers that will access the anonymized
data: First, it provides publisher anonymity. A client c sends some pair
(k, v) in an encrypted form. SPADS ensures that (1) only one node is
able to decrypt (k, v) and (2) this node is not able to learn or deduce any
information about c’s identity or identiﬁcation in the system. Second, it
provides decoupled authentication. While servers neither store nor use any
authentication information from users, the protocol allows by construction
only legitimate and registered users to put information in the DHT. Third,
it provides rate limitation. Registered and legitimate users are not allowed
to put more than n (k, v) pairs in the DHT per period of time Δ. n and Δ
are system-wide parameters known by all servers. Furthermore, since rate
limitation is a process that takes place in the long term, it is protected against
corruption due to servers churn.
2.4 SPADS: Publisher Anonymization for DHT
Storage
This section gives a high-level overview of how SPADS works. Unlike the
AA server, which is a special, trusted entity, SPADS’ servers are generic and
reactive nodes, which may perform any of the roles presented in Table 2.1 on
demand, depending on the message they receive.
We explain below the the main steps of SPADS’ mechanisms. The expla-
nations are based on Figure 2.5.
Any user must ﬁrst register with the AA, which checks its legitimacy
using external means, e.g., a “captcha” (noted ). After to this one-time
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Role Description
EP The Entry Point (EP) is in direct communication with the
client, and it is the ﬁrst server the message goes through.
AIDn
1 ≤ n ≤ f
The Anonymous Insertion Delegates (AIDs) are the nodes
that remove each of the onion routing layers until the
message has been completely decrypted.
CM n
1 ≤ n ≤ r
The Credential Managers (CMs) perform token-based rate
limitation of the client’s messages.
Table 2.1: Server roles in SPADS.
CM
authenticates
client
Authentication Authority
registers, validates
Rate limitation
Client
EP
a_put
(uid,[k,v])
Anonymization DHT
CM
AIDf put(k,v)?
1
2
3
4
5
CM
get
credentials
Figure 2.5: SPADS: general principle.
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operation, the AA registers () the user to a subset of r servers that will
act as CMs (r=3 in Figure 2.5). The set of r CMs is diﬀerent for each client.
They are collectively responsible for the limitation of the rate at which this
client can send messages. SPADS introduces a single DHT API extension:
a_put(uid, [(k, v)]) (). The pair (k, v) is forwarded by a series of f + 1
intermediate servers, starting with the EP and followed by f AIDs. The EP
and AIDs are selected among the list of servers known by the client. This list
is periodically refreshed by contacting the AA.
The ﬁrst phase is to enforce the rate limitation for the client. The EP
knows the authentication information of the client, in particular, its IP address
and uid. It uses the latter to perform the rate limitation through the use
of credential (tokens). The EP obtains the number of credentials the client
is currently allowed to use, by asking the r CM servers (). If there are no
credentials available, the client is notiﬁed by the EP and the process stops.
Thereafter, the process of anonymization takes place by forwarding be-
tween the AIDs. The last AID is then responsible for sending the regular
put(k, v) to the DHT, on behalf of the client (). The process ensures that
any element that could relate to the identity of the client is lost on the way,
and is never accessible to the last AID, even if at most f servers collude to
spy on the user. The last AID is the only peer able to fully decode the (k, v)
pair initially sent by the client.
2.5 Algorithms
This section presents the algorithmic details and properties of each of the
phases mentioned in the previous section: client legitimation and authentica-
tion, management of insertion credentials for clients, and publisher anonymiza-
tion.
Client legitimation
The ﬁrst action is to legitimate the client, that is, to ensure that the client is
operated by some human and not by a robot performing multiple automated
registrations. This action is performed only once, upon installation of the
client software. It relies on Web-based registration at the AA, or a similar
method (Figure 2.6-). After the legitimation, the AA returns a client/user
identiﬁer (uid) to the client. This uid is randomly generated over a large
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Figure 2.6: SPADS: one-time legitimation and authentication (while SPADS can
be built upon any kind of DHT, we pictured a ring-based DHT [106, 115] for the
sake of graphical simplicity).
identiﬁer space. The AA records the username and the hash of the password
of the client to allow for later authentication without the need to re-legitimate
the user.
The uid is used by the client for authentication when sending data to
the DHT. A uid cannot be linked to the identity of the client, as only
the AA knows the relationship between the uid and the username of the
client. Nonetheless, there is still the risk that the uid be stolen by some
other malevolent client, which can then use this stolen identity to obtain
illegitimate credentials. To reduce this risk, a timeout can be associated
with each uid : the client-side software automatically fetches a new uid just
before the timeout expires, using the username and the hash of the client’s
password. Note that the risk of having personal information identifying a
user (e.g., username/password) stolen and misused is a widespread problem
on the Internet and it is not speciﬁc to SPADS.
Client authentication
The uid generated for a client, either as a renewal or as a ﬁrst-time authentica-
tion, is hashed, signed by the AA’s private key, and sent to a set of r locations
in the DHT (Figure 2.6-). The servers in charge of the corresponding keys,
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the credentials managers (CM), play the important role of monitoring the
usage of credentials by the client and enforcing rate-limitation policies. The
r locations are obtained by hashing the uid of the client with r diﬀerent hash
functions: h1, . . . , hr. These hash functions are known by all servers and by
the AA. hi is typically the SHA1 hash of uid using i as the seed of the hash
function. Changing the uid of the client results in r diﬀerent positions in the
DHT and a new set of diﬀerent CMs with high probability.
Credential management
Once a CM has registered the hash of the uid of some client, it starts
provisioning credentials based on time and the rate-limitation policy. Each
of the r servers is accumulating credentials for the client separately. The r
servers only know h(uid) and have no mean to recompute uid itself. Each
CM has no possibility to calculate the keys for the r − 1 other CMs. This
means that the CM cannot cooperate to abuse the system. The management
of credentials is a long-term operation. In case one of the CM fails and is not
immediately replaced by a neighbor, or if the credentials count is not properly
updated because of the loss of a message, the credentials allowance returned
to the EP by the various CMs may diﬀer. Using r ≥ 3 servers allows us to
proceed to a majority-vote between the returned values, and to report to the
AA the server that consistently responds with an erroneous value compared
to the majority. We allow a slight diﬀerence in the results returned by the
various CMs to take into account the absence of clock synchronization, and
delays between servers, e.g., a diﬀerence of minus/plus one credential reported
by some CMs is not deemed erroneous.
The maximal number of credentials that can be used during a period
of time Δ is noted n. On each CM, and for each h(uid) entry, the list
of credentials that were granted during the last Δ units of time is kept.
The credentials left for some client is simply n minus the size of this list.
Nonetheless, when a h(uid) has been registered at some CM, the maximal
number of credentials the client can get in the ﬁrst Δ units of time is
proportional to the fraction of Δ spent since registration. This measure is
necessary to discourage clients from regularly asking the AA to register again
with the system using a diﬀerent uid : the expected number of credentials
that the client can get with such re-registration is always less than what the
client would have had without re-registering.
There is one exception for regular re-authentications allowed by the pro-
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tocol to prevent the stealing of uids: no more than once every s time units
(re-authentication period, known by the client and the AA), the AA allows
a client to get a new uid but copies the value of its credential count to the
CMs in charge of this new uid.
Server selection
The AA plays the role of a public key server for clients. The certiﬁcates are
used by clients to select the servers that will participate to the anonymization
process. It is necessary that the client knows the public key of these servers
beforehand. Asking the servers for their key would expose the client to the
risk of having her identity inferred by one of the server during subsequent
routing.
Each client obtains an initial list of certiﬁcates from the AA after its
legitimation and authentication. Certiﬁcates allow clients to verify that the
public key of some server they would like to use is certiﬁed by the AA, and
thus that this server’s information (IP address) is unique and correct. The
client simply veriﬁes by decrypting the signature of the certiﬁcate with AA’s
public key and comparing it to the IP address and public key stored in the
certiﬁcate.
In the list maintained by the client, each certiﬁcate is associated with the
time of its reception from the AA. Periodically, the list is cut down from half
of its items, by removing the oldest certiﬁcates. These removed certiﬁcates
are replaced by new ones gathered from the AA. Clients keep track of the
servers they use to bias the selection process and ensure some load balancing
on the servers.
Failed servers are reported by other servers to the AA, which will stop
handing their certiﬁcate to clients.
Anonymization
SPADS uses a variant of Chaum mixes [23] to achieve publisher-anonymization.
The mechanism ensures anonymization even if up to f servers are colluding to
get the data in clear form, along with the identity of the client that produced it.
A set of f +1 servers are selected by the client among the list of certiﬁcates it
knows. The ﬁrst server is the EP. The next servers are AIDs. The (k, v) pair,
in encrypted form, will follow this path: client → EP → AID1 → · · · → AIDf .
The objective of the routing and associated encryption is to ensure that the
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message ends in clear form at the last AID, but that the identity of the
publisher has been lost in the process. Thus, no intermediate node is able to
get the content of the message along with the identity of the publisher, even
if all nodes in the path until the last node are colluding.
Algorithm 1: Encoding a (k, v) pair at the client.
Notations:
[m]k: AES encryption of m using key k
[[m]]{pub|priv}k: RSA encryption of m
1 Encode ((k, v), {AID1,. . . ,AIDf})
2 s ← random number (256 bits)
3 c ← [(k, v)]s
4 h ← SHA1(c)
// Encode for AIDf (without next hop)
5 p ← [[⊥, h, s]]AIDf .pubk
// Encode for AID1...f−1 (with next hop)
6 i ← f − 1
7 while i ≥ 1 do
8 p ← [[AID i+1.addr, h, p]]AIDi.pubk
9 i ← i− 1
10 return (c, p)
The principle of the anonymizing routing is to encode the message with a
randomly generated AES key s at the client, and to encode this key several
times with all the public keys of the AIDs on the path. Note that we do not
encode the content itself using the RSA public keys as the size of the (k, v)
pair can be of any size: RSA generates encrypted versions that grow larger
and larger as the content is re-encoded, and the bandwidth cost increase would
be dramatic. This multiple encoding process is described by Algorithm 1.
The client starts by encoding for AIDf (end of the path). It encodes in c
the (k, v) pair to be sent to the DHT using some randomly generated AES
key s, and computes the hash of c in a variable h. Then, the key s is encoded
together with the IP address of the next AID (which is by convention the null
value ⊥ for AIDf ) and h. This process is repeated for all AIDs along the path.
Note that the ﬁeld p, which contains the information to be transmitted to the
next AID, is encoded using that next step’s public key and its size will grow
31
2.5. ALGORITHMS
as it contains the information for more and more steps. Conversely, the two
ﬁrst ﬁelds (the IP address of the next AID and the hash of the AES-encoded
content) are of ﬁxed size (4 and 16 bytes, respectively), which allows each
AID to easily separate the information that it needs to transmit.
The multiple encryption of the AES key, using the public keys of all the
AIDs on the path, implies that the message has to be decoded by all AIDs to
be AES-decoded by the last of them. The client sends the ﬁnal pair (c, p) to
the EP along with the IP address of the ﬁrst AID. The EP checks then the
credentials for the client and sends the pair to the ﬁrst AID, which is able
to decode the next AID’s IP address, the hash of the AES-encoded content,
and the RSA-encoded p for the next AID. Each AID checks that the hash of
the AES-encoded content c matches the hash that it got by decoding p with
its own private key. If this content integrity veriﬁcation fails, the message is
simply dropped. The forwarding process repeats until IP address of the next
step equals ⊥ (this happens at the last AID). Then, the decoded content of
p gives the AES key s for decoding c, and the (k, v) is sent to the DHT on
behalf of the client.
A correct (non colluding) node only sends to the next AID a pair (c, p) if
it has been able to verify that c is valid using the hash h embedded in p. It
is not possible for some AID on the path to corrupt either the AES-encoded
message c or the RSA-encoded p, so as to transmit information for another
colluding AID, while passing through a non-colluding AID. It is not possible
to corrupt c (e.g., to append the IP address of the user at the beginning of
c), as the hash of c is checked by each AID on the way to the destination,
and the message will be dropped if the check fails at some correct AID. It is
not possible either for some AID to corrupt p or include more information in
it as it would require knowing the private key of the next AIDs.
Correctness
We consider f colluding peers that share all their state and information,
including their private keys. The client selects f + 1 peers for the EP and
the AIDs. There are two cases. The ﬁrst case is when all the f AIDs are
colluding. In this case they all get the content in clear by sharing their private
key. The only node that knows the IP address of the client is the EP, but
since there are already f nodes colluding, it cannot be involved and therefore,
does not transmit the IP address of the client. In the second case, f − 1
AIDs are colluding with the EP to get the content along with the IP address
32
CHAPTER 2. ANONYMITY AND TRUST IN LS-DSS
of the client. To get the plain content, its encrypted version needs to go
through some f th AID. The IP address of the client is not kept by this f th
AID, regardless of its position in the path, and thus not transmitted to the
next AID.
One could note that the second case can be prone to an attack by colluding
peers based on traﬃc correlation over time. Indeed, two colluding peers could
bypass an intermediate AID and communicate by diﬀerent means to correlate
the fact that two messages they received within a short time window are
related, and then virtually isolate the correct AID from the chain. In order to
get rid of this risk, each AID may wait for a random amount of time before
sending the data further. Note that this has absolutely no impact on the
client, since the client is not expecting a reply or acknowledgment for her
insertion.
Bulk anonymous put operations
In the current description, only one (k, v) pair is sent with one a_put(k, v)
operation and using one credential. It is desirable to also allow users to
send several (k, v) pairs within the same message using only one credential.
The last AID is then in charge of 1. splitting and sending the content as
several (k, v) pairs and 2. enforcing the maximal number of allowed pairs
per credential used, by dropping remaining pairs after the limit has been
reached. It can be noted that this extension modiﬁes the fairness property of
the system. Instead of having each inserted pair equally likely to be ignored
regardless of its origin, with bulk a_put() operations the aggregate sets of
pairs are equally likely to be dropped (but their size may diﬀer hence breaking
the fairness property).
2.6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of SPADS, the cost it imposes
on the servers, and the delays for anonymously sending information to the
network. All experiments are based on a prototype implementation running on
a cluster. We ﬁrst explore the average cost breakdown for a single anonymous
put operation made by a client. Then, we evaluate the variation in delay
imposed by varying f (how many colluding servers are supported at most)
and varying the number of credential managers. We do not evaluate the
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Figure 2.7: Breakdown of the computational cost associated with an a_put()
operation, for the client and the diﬀerent server roles (EP, AID1 to AID3).
credential management itself, as it does not constitute a performance-critical
operation.
Experimental settings
SPADS is implemented in the Lua [65] language, with some performance-
critical functions written as C libraries (hashing, encryption and decryption).
For the server side, we leverage SPLAY [82] its libraries. The client is
implemented in JavaScript. We use an implementation of the Pastry [106]
DHT written entirely in Lua. Our Pastry implementation uses the parameters
from the original paper. All experiments were run on a cluster of 12 machines,
each equipped with a 2.4 GHz Pentium IV processor and 2 GB of main
memory. The machines are linked through a 1 GBps switched Ethernet LAN.
Unless explicitly noted, we use the following parameters. All AES keys
are 256 bits long, RSA public and private keys use 1024 bits. All hashes use
the SHA1 function, which yields 128 bits secure hashes. The size of the DHT
is 1,000 nodes, i.e., each machine of the cluster runs several Pastry nodes.
Computational cost at the servers
First, we evaluate the baseline computational cost of using publisher anonymiza-
tion, with f = 3 (i.e., using a chain of 3 AIDs) and a set of 3 CMs. The
inserted (k, v) pair is of minimal size: v is a random string of 16 bytes, k a
key of 16 bytes (32 bytes total). We measure the processor time spent at
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Figure 2.8: Computational cost of the encoding phase at the client side, for
varying data sizes and number of AIDs.
each of the servers on the chain, starting from the EP to the last AID, and
present the breakdown of these costs in Figure 2.7, averaged over a set of
1,000 anonymous insertions done in sequence. This ﬁgure does not take into
account the time required for transmitting the message between servers; it
corresponds to the processing time at each server between message reception
and response generation.
We observe that the rate limitation phase (done by the EP, by asking
the CMs) only costs 364 μs for the EP and 8 μs for each of the 3 CMs (a
CM only needs to look up a table and reply with the value, while the EP
needs to compute 3 hash functions to determine the keys of the 3 CMs. The
anonymization phase itself involves some RSA cryptography, and the costs at
each AID depends on the size of the message that has to be decrypted using
the AID’s private key (p in Algorithm 1). As the message progresses on the
anonymization path, the size of p becomes smaller. The computational cost
of decrypting the message for some AID is proportional to the number of AID
that remain after it in the path, i.e., the number of times the p part of the
message is encrypted. Note however that these costs are baseline values and
are totally independent of the size of the message: only the AES decryption
of the message at the last AID depends on the size of the initial message.
SPADS exploits an eﬃcient C-backed AES implementation. The average cost
for decrypting a message using AES at the last AID is 288 ns, 34 μs and
24 ms for messages of size 1KB, 128KB, and 1MB respectively.
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Figure 2.9: CDF of the total time spent in the anonymizing path.
Computational cost at the client
We evaluate the time required at the client for encoding a message (a (k, v)
pair), as a function of (1) the size of the message and (2) the length of the
anonymization path (given by f). Figure 2.8 presents the evolution of the
time required for encrypting a message as a function of its size and f .
The cost of encryption at the client is composed of two parts: the encryp-
tion of the content using the randomly generated AES key, and the encryption
using RSA of that key for the anonymizing chain. The cost of the AES
encryption depends on the size of the data, while the cost of the nested RSA
encryptions depend on the number of AIDs that are used (f). The minimal
size message of 32 bytes gives the baseline for RSA encryption. As expected,
the cost of AES encryption increases linearly with the size of the data being
encrypted. For the typical size of data items for which SPADS is designed
for, this cost is perfectly acceptable.
Anonymization delays
Our next observations are based on the delay between the client’s call to
a_put(), and the moment the message is sent by the last AID to the DHT,
on behalf of the client. The delay includes the communication with the EP,
and the chain of decryption and forwarding between the AIDs. Moreover,
this delay does not reﬂect a quality of service measure for the client, as the
latter does not expect a reply for its insertion. We did not add random delays
at each forwarding step. Instead, it allows us to evaluate the scalability of the
approach. As network delays are stable and very low in our cluster, a high
delay means that more work is done at the servers involved in the process.
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Figure 2.9(a) presents the cumulative distribution of delays for a set of
1,000 requests done by 100 separate clients (for each client, insertions are
done in sequence) for various values of f , hence various path lengths for
anonymization. Increasing the number of AIDs, combined with the linear
increase of the processing cost for decoding the RSA-encoded content as the
AID is closer to the source, implies that the overall cost is evolving empirically
in O(
∑f
i=1 i) = O(f
2).
Figure 2.9(b) presents the delay variation when both the number of AIDs
and CMs vary between 3, 6 and 9. The curves present almost identical
behavior for the cases where the number of AIDs is the same; they are
therefore grouped by the labels “3 AID”, “6 AID” and “9 AID”. This means
that the impact of varying only the number of CMs is negligible. This behavoir
is expected, as the requests from the EP to the CMs are done in parallel.
2.7 Related work
SPADS shares rationales, algorithmic techniques and design choices with a
consequent body of previous work. We present related work along the lines
of anonymizing systems, P2P overlays for anonymization, and rate limitation
mechanisms in decentralized settings.
Anonymizing path
We reviewed onion routing in Section 2.2, among other well-know anonymiza-
tion techniques. The most widely known implementation of the onion routing
is the Tor anonymization layer [36]. Tor allows to tunnel a TCP connection
through one or several relay server(s), among the ones that are volunteering to
the system. The onion routers are not able to see content of a communication
(and the destination of the TCP connection) if they are in a position in the
path where they can know the IP address of the client. This concept is
similarly used in SPADS.
Torsk [88] proposes to replace the relay selection of Tor, which is based on
servers acting as PKS, with a selection based on the Kademlia DHT [87]. Other
systems that use Chaum mixes for anonymization are AP3 [91], Bifrost [71],
and Tarzan [46].
Publius [124] allows users to publish anonymously Web content but also
prevents the data that has been sent by some user from being modiﬁed by
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another user, by leveraging fountain codes and multiple uses of onion routing.
Finally, Cashmere [132] applies the principle of Chaum mixes for commu-
nication anonymization but relies on groups of servers rather than individual
ones for retransmitting the data. This allows for a better resilience to failures,
as any node in each group of servers can act as a mix and the probability of
failure of all nodes in one given group is lowered.
The principle of using groups of servers rather than single servers can be
straightforwardly applied to SPADS. It is worth mentioning, however, that
using groups of nodes imply that these groups will need to share a common
private key, making the power of colluding peers much greater, and thus
trading anonymization eﬃciency for system stability.
We note that, unlike SPADS, none of these systems provides support for
limiting the rate of information or the usage of the system by users.
P2P overlays for anonymization
FreeHaven [35] and FreeNet [24] are P2P unstructured overlays that also
provide guarantees on the traceability of the data that is sent to the system.
Nonetheless, due to their unstructured nature, they do not allow to apply
rate limitation to the usage of the system by clients, nor do they allow a
complete recall for the requests on the content that has been sent by users.
Rate limitation and spam limitation
Klonowski et al. [70] propose an admission control protocol combined with
an anonymous channel protocol. Compared to this system, SPADS does not
require that the servers sign each and every incoming and outgoing message.
We are not aware of any work that mixes the two goals of anonymizing
publishers in a distributed setting, and limiting the inﬂuence of cheating
users.
As mentioned in Section 2.3, the problem of verifying that the servers
themselves are acting correctly is orthogonal to the problem of validating the
usage of the system by the clients. This veriﬁcation can be done using systems
such as the PeerReview accountability system [53], which we described in
Section 2.3.
A common technique for reducing the impact of spammers is to blacklist
the users that have been detected as corrupted (e.g., by DNS blacklisting, or
as part of the DHT protocol, for instance by using the NeighborhoodWatch
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DHT [10]). With these approaches, cheaters need to be detected after they
have sent their content, which is obviously in contradiction with the objective
of publisher anonymization.
SPADS’ rate limitation, based on limited credentials allowance for each
user that needs to send data to a distributed system, is shared by DQE [125].
DQE’s objective is to ﬁght spam in email communications by limiting the rate
at which any user can send email. This eliminates the interest of sending spam,
which comes from the ease of ﬂooding oﬀered by the email infrastructure.
Similarly to SPADS, credentials are managed in a decentralized manner
by quota allocators nodes, but communications are not anonymized in any
manner.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented SPADS, a publisher-anonymizing, rate-
limiting publication interface for untrustworthy clients willing to send privacy-
sensitive data to a DHT, itself based on untrustworthy servers. SPADS
uses a combination of cryptography techniques and random path selection
(Chaum mixes) to ensure that the identity of the client that publishes some
information is lost on its way to the server that can process it, even if at most
f servers are colluding to spy on the user. Rate-limitation is achieved by
authenticating users with the DHT and using a robust credential management
protocol. Experimental evaluation using a prototype deployed on a cluster
assesses the applicability of the approach, in terms of computational load and
delays.
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Chapter 3
Auditing for Large-Scale
Distributed Aggregation Systems
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present the design, implementation and evaluation of CADA
(Collaborative Auditing for Distributed Aggregation). CADA operates in
the context of an aggregation network, composed by: (i) clients, which
send contributions to the aggregations, and (ii) servers, that aggregate these
contributions. The system model will be explained later with more detail.
CADA provides probabilistic auditing mechanisms to limit the impact
of a server that maliciously tries to bias aggregations. The mechanisms
provided by CADA can be combined with the functionalities provided by
SPADS (publisher anonymization and rate limitation), to build distributed
aggregation systems where:
• anonymity is assured, and
• the impact of cheating clients and cheating servers is reduced to negligi-
ble levels.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the system
model and the problem deﬁnition in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents a high-
level overview of the oracles. The auditing mechanisms are described in detail
in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 for insertion and aggregation biasing, respectively. The
oracles are evaluated in Section 3.6. Related work in the ﬁeld is presented in
Section 3.7. Finally, we summarize in Section 3.8.
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3.2 System model and Problem deﬁnition
In this section, we present the model considered for aggregation middleware
and the hypothesis that will later support collaborative auditing.
More speciﬁcally, the systems we consider rely on the aggregation of
discrete distributions of data over a set of possible values. A distribution is
composed of a set of < value, counter > pairs, where each possible value in
the set is associated with a counter of its occurrences as aggregated from
client insertions. Note that the number of options is not necessarily bounded
a priori. Each distribution is associated with a unique key, itself associated
to a node (or group of coordinated nodes) acting as an aggregation point.
Distributed aggregation middleware helps locating this node by employing an
indexing mechanism such as a multi-hop distributed hash table [106,115] or
a single-hop routing layer [33]. The node receives and aggregates insertions
from clients, and answers to requests for part or all of the distribution values
and counters.
Throughout the description, we will refer to the notations summarized in
Table 3.1.
We consider an aggregation middleware infrastructure formed by N servers.
In the context of CADA, there are two important assumptions that support
the design of the bias detection oracles: the entry points uniform distribution
hypothesis, and the authenticated servers hypothesis.
Like in SPADS, servers are polyvalent and can perform any role, depending
on the message they receive. The FP is the contact point for clients wishing
to send or receive information to the system. Any client can contact any of
the servers that will act as an FP for this transaction. This contact server
is not necessarily the server performing the aggregation but is in charge of
propagating the request in the system to the appropriate aggregation server,
and contacting back the client.
The entry points uniform distribution hypothesis is the assumption of a
random and uniform distribution of the number of requests that are received
by each FP and thus propagated to the appropriate AP. This can be enforced
by the use of one or several proxy servers or redirect servers (e.g., DNS
servers), placed as a layer between the clients and CADA, that distribute the
load evenly among all the FPs.
The entry points uniform distribution hypothesis is also enforced when
using the SPADS layer to support anonymization, as it exploits multi-hop
anonymizing routes following the principle of Chaum mixes and onion rout-
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Element Description
N Number of servers participating to the aggregation
service.
FPn
1 ≤ n ≤ N
The Forwarding Point (FP) is the role performed by
a server when it is contacted by a client for routing
contributions into the aggregation network.
APn
(1 ≤ n ≤ N)
The Aggregation Point (AP) is the role performed
by a server when it processes and aggregates con-
tributions propagated from the FPs on behalf of a
client, for a distribution it maintains. AP(k) denotes
that the AP in charge of the aggregation for the
distribution D(k) associated with key k.
avk ≡ a
avk.c ≡ a.c
avk.i ≡ a.i
An accumulator is a component of a distributionD(k)
for a value v: D(k) = {av1k , . . . , avmk , . . . }. When con-
sidering a single accumulator for some oracle, we
simply denote it as a and omit indices. a.c (for
counter) denotes the value of the accumulator, and
a.i (insertions) denotes the number of insertions re-
ceived for computing a.c (i.e., a.c
a.i
gives the average
insertion value).
Table 3.1: Notations for the base aggregation system without auditing support.
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ing [23,36]. In this context, the last server of the onion chain acts as the FP
to the aggregation layer. This last element of the path is selected uniformly
at random like the other elements from the full set of servers in the system,
hence fulﬁlling the hypothesis. CADA and SPADS are independent and the
presence of the latter is not required to support the operation of the former
as long as the entry point uniform distribution hypothesis holds.
Furthermore, our approach could be extended to any kind of stochastic
distribution of the number of requests per FP as long as the distribution
can be given as an input to the oracles or gathered during runtime. These
extensions can be seen as future work as it is described in our conclusive
remarks (Section 3.8).
The basis of our second hypothesis for the design of CADA oracles,
the authenticated servers hypothesis, relies on the existence of a trusted
Authentication Authority (AA), where all servers register and authenticate,
and on the fact that all servers know the public key of every other server. This
is needed to support the signing of insertions by the FP (See Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2: Signature for authentication and uniqueness at the FP
level.
Notations:
[[m]]{pub|priv}k: RSA encryption of m
EP id: entry point’s identiﬁer
EPpubk: entry point’s RSA public key
m+ n: concatenation of the byte chains m and n
s: sequence number, starts at 0
1 Sign (k, v)
2 h ← SHA1(k+ s+ v)
3 p ← [[h]]EPpubk
4 s ← s+ 1
5 return (k, v,EPid, s, p)
A server acting as an FP signs the requests received by clients according to
Algorithm 2. The FP calculates a hash of the concatenation of the destination
key (to certify the routing destination), the request itself (to support an
integrity check), and a sequence number (to ensure that a message cannot be
taken into account twice at the AP level). The hash is then signed with the
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FP private key in order to support authentication, and sent along with the
request.
The aggregation layer uses an indexing mechanism such as a multi-hop
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [106,115] or a single-hop routing layer [33].
The server responsible for aggregating the distribution D(k) associated to
key k, and denoted as AP(k), is located by this indexing mechanism. When
the request arrives, the AP ﬁrst checks the validity of its signature and the
authentication of the sender FP, and then processes the request. A request
can be a query for part or the entire distribution or an insertion. Insertions
increase the total associated with a value v in the distribution and stored in
an accumulator avk. The two components avk.c and avk.i contain the total of
the counter and the number of insertions so far, respectively. The counter
entries avk.c of the accumulators for all values v forms the distribution D(k),
while the contributions allow computing the average increment avk.c/avk.i.
The case for collaborative auditing
In our large-scale context, the aggregation operation can be performed by
any server in the system, and these servers are typically located in several
diﬀerent administrative domains that do not necessarily trust each other.
Nodes thus consider that some of the other nodes may wish to inﬂuence
the system operation in order to bias the distribution aggregates. The bias
attempts can take two forms, illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Insertion bias. First, some servers in the distributed aggregation middle-
ware may be under control of an attacker willing to inﬂuence the aggregation
for some key k managed by another server. In this case, the servers under
the control of the attacker may generate fake insertions, e.g., to favor a given
value over the others regardless of the inputs of the clients. As an example,
in an aggregation system collecting feedback on website accesses and search
queries [42], an aggregation server under the control of an attacker may wish
to promote a given website regardless of the interest as perceived by users,
making the recommendations obtained from user feedback useless.
Aggregation bias. Second, a server proceeding to the aggregation for a
key k may wish to return a counterfeit distribution that favors or disfavors
one of the values in contradiction with the increment operations received.
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Figure 3.1: Servers in aggregation middleware can bias the results in two ways:
by performing fake insertions (insertion bias) or by returning incorrect aggregation
results for the keys they are in charge of (aggregation bias).
A typical example is for the aforementioned media popularity application,
where the server responsible for the aggregation may be under the control of
an institution with ﬁnancial interests in one of the aggregated values.
3.3 Collaborative Auditing for Distributed Ag-
gregation
In Collaborative Auditing for Distributed Aggregation (CADA), we are inter-
ested in detecting the two forms of bias introduced by servers participating
to the aggregation layer (see Section 3.1). In this section, we give a high-level
overview of the oracles that we use for detecting attempts by the servers to
introduce bias.
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Adversary model
First, servers may exceed their role as FP and inﬂuence distributions they
are not in charge of, by forging and sending fake insertions to some APs, or
modifying insertions received from the clients. A variant of this bias is when
nodes acting as FP for clients selectively drop insertions. We treat these two
variants of insertion biasing conjointly. Second, servers may exceed their role
as AP and bias one of the distribution they are in charge of, by returning
fake counts for the requests they get from FPs on behalf of clients.
Detecting bias attempts
Our objective in CADA is to propose a set of oracles that trigger alarms, or
suspicions, when detecting that a server is attempting to bias the distribution
aggregation operation. This notion of suspicion is probabilistic, and is based on
a statistical test over the observed behavior of the server(s) and their expected
behavior. As such, it may yield false positives (unjustiﬁed suspicions) but a
node that is eﬀectively biasing will get a much larger number of suspicions
than one that is not.
Our oracles, being probabilistic, are associated to conﬁdence levels that
allow expressing a trade-oﬀ between sensitivity and number of false positives.
The conﬁdence level represents the degree of certainty that one has about a
given assumption. For example, if a croupier takes an ace of spades out of a
card deck (which has a probability of happening equal to 1/52th, or about
2%), we can say that he is cheating with conﬁdence level of about 98%. That
is because after doing a substantial number of tries, if the croupier is not
cheating we should get such result only 2% of the time.
Even high conﬁdence levels like the one from the example can easily
return a false positive after one try. This is why the output of CADA is not
meant to be taken into account to directly ban or punish a server after one
suspicion, but to serve as an input for trust or reputation systems that will
accumulate suspicions to lower the reputation of a server. As a result, servers
can sporadically cheat with a certain probability of not being detected, but a
server that intends to cheat frequently, in order to alter the aggregation in a
considerable way, will be detected by the accumulation of suspicions.
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Figure 3.2: General description of the oracles.
Element Description
a.I Vector of the number of insertions received from each
of the FPs. For instance, a.I[n] denotes the number of
insertions received from EPn; and
∑N
n=1 a.I[n] = a.i.
a.C Vector of the sum of the contributions to the accumulator
counter received from each of the FPs: a.C[n] denotes the
contribution to the total counter a.c received from EPn.∑N
n=1 a.C[n] = a.c.
a.S Vector of the sum of the squares of each of the contributions
to the accumulator counter received from each of the
FPs. If a.incn1 , . . . , a.incnm are the individual contributions
received for the accumulator avk from EPn, then a.S[n] =∑m
x=1 (a.inc
n
x)
2.
Table 3.2: Additions to the AP state for the insertion bias oracle.
48
CHAPTER 3. AUDITING FOR LS-DAS
Insertion bias oracle
Our ﬁrst oracle aims at detecting servers exceeding their roles as FP by sending
illegitimate contributions that were not initially sent by users, or dropping
or altering user contributions. This oracle is illustrated in Figure 3.2(a). It
is run by each server as part of its AP role, in a periodic manner, or after a
given number of contributions have been received since the last audit. This
oracle monitors independently the counter for each value in the distribution.
We denote the accumulator being audited as a. Based on the entry points
uniform distribution hypothesis, we can derive two important properties over
the set of contributions received for an accumulator: with a large number of
inputs to a, the number of contributions received from each FP should be
nearly equal, and the distribution of contributions to the total from each FP
should also be similar, as the set of input received from each FP is simply a
random uniform sample of all the client insertions. The authentication of the
original FP is achieved thanks to the authenticated entry points hypothesis.
The oracle works by comparing the statistical properties of the set of
insertions, and their number, received from each FP for an accumulator
a. Note that we do not need to keep the full set of these insertions, but
only aggregated values, of size O(N). The additions to the state of the AP
necessary to support the oracle are deﬁned in Table 3.2 and illustrated in
Figure 3.2(a). We replace the component a.i (number of insertions) by a vector
a.I that keeps the number of insertions received from each FP independently.
Similarly, the component a.c (total of the accumulator) is replaced by a.C, a
vector that distinguishes between each FP contribution to the counter a.c.
Finally, to support the detection of statistically signiﬁcant variations in the
variance of elements sent by each FP, an additional vector a.S collects the
sum of the squares of all contributions received by each FP.
The insertion bias oracle operates in two steps. It ﬁrst checks that the
number of insertions for each FP follows a uniform multinomial distribution
using a Pearson’s goodness-of-ﬁt test. If that is not the case, it removes
iteratively the most deviating FP from the test, and checks again the similarity
with a multinomial distribution, until a tolerable level of conﬁdence is reached.
In the second step it performs again the Pearson test with the remaining
nodes, but taking into account the contribution to the total for each FP. This
step requires the use of a.S, as we detail in Section 3.4. All the FPs that
are removed during the test are reported as suspicious. We describe formally
in the next section how these elements are used for assessing statistically
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Element Description
D′j(k)
(1 ≤ j ≤ R)
D′j(k) is a shadow aggregation of D(k); it holds a
sample of the insertions sent to AP(k).
AP ′j(k)
(1 ≤ j ≤ R)
Each D′j(k) is maintained by a shadow aggregation
point AP’j(k).
ϕ Is the shadowing ratio; it represents the probabil-
ity that an insertion being aggregated into D(k)
is also sent to the shadow aggregations.
Table 3.3: Additions to the AP state for the aggregation bias oracle.
signiﬁcant deviance, which results in a suspicion for the FP considered.
Aggregation bias oracle
Our second oracle aims at detecting servers that exceed their roles as AP,
that is, that do not aggregate properly the insertions they receive but rather
favor or penalize some accumulator a over the others in the distribution D(k).
The principle of the aggregation bias oracle is illustrated in Figure 3.2(b).
The extension required to the aggregation layer is given in Table 3.3.
The main idea of the aggregation bias oracle is to maintain R shadow
aggregations of the distribution. These shadow aggregations are maintained
by R diﬀerent shadow AP’s. A system wide parameter, the shadowing ratio ϕ,
determines the probability for an FP to send an increment request not only to
AP(k) but also to the R shadow AP’(k). The operation done by the shadow
AP’(k) is exactly the same as the normal AP(k), except that they operate
on a sample of all increments received. The identity of the shadow AP’(k) is
determined by hashing k with multiple hash functions h1(k), h2(k), . . . , hR(k)
deﬁned system-wide.
As we describe in Section 3.5, the oracle seeks to compare the distribution
of values on the main distribution D(k) and the shadow distributions.
Periodic auditing is carried out in two ways. First, whenever receiving a
query request for a distribution k, the associated FP performs an audit of
AP(k) with probability α. Second, FPs periodically audit random APs. A
suspicion is triggered if there is a signiﬁcant enough probabilistic diﬀerence
between the main and the shadow aggregations.
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3.4 Auditing mechanisms for insertion bias
The insertion bias oracle is called by a server as part of its AP role. The oracle
checks all the accumulators avk for all the distributions that this node aggre-
gates. Each accumulator is checked individually. We denote the accumulator
under test as a for simplicity. The oracle performs in two steps:
1. First, it detects if insertions were made by some EPs that are suspected
of being insertion biasing attempts by forging or dropping insertions.
The AP uses an iterative algorithm that checks if the vector of the
number of insertions a.I represents a uniform multinomial distribution;
2. In a second step, the AP detects FPs that are suspected of performing
insertion biasing by modifying the content of the insertions they relay.
We use a similar algorithm that operates on the contributions a.C.
The Pearson’s goodness-of-ﬁt test
Based on the entry points uniform distribution hypothesis, the vector a.I =
(a.I[1], . . . , a.I[n], . . . , a.I [N ]) should be a random vector following a multino-
mial distribution with uniform parameters p1 = · · · = pn = · · · = pN = 1/N
in the regular case with no bias. The deviation from this regular case can be
tested using a standard statistical goodness-of-ﬁt test. We use the Pearson’s
goodness-of-ﬁt test. It requires to compute the following statistic T (a.I):
T (a.I) =
N∑
n=1
(
a.I[n]−
∑N
n=1 a.I[n]
N
)2
∑N
n=1 a.I[n]
N
= N · σ
2(a.I)
μ(a.I)
,
where
μ(a.I) =
(
∑N
n=1 a.I[n])
N
is the mean of the components of the vector a.I, and
σ2(a.I) =
(
∑N
n=1(a.I[n]− μ(a.I))2)
N
is the variance of its components. The no bias hypothesis can be rejected
with a level of conﬁdence c (0 ≤ c ≤ 1) deﬁned as c = cdf [χ2N−1](T (a.I)),
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Figure 3.3: Conﬁdence level vs. variance-to-mean ratio.
where cdf [χ2F ](x) is the value at x of the cumulative distribution function of
the chi-square probability distribution with F degrees of freedom χ2F [13]. It
results:
c = cdf [χ2N−1]
(
N · σ
2(a.I)
μ(a.I)
)
(3.1)
where we denote ρ = σ
2(a.I)
μ(a.I)
. We observe (see Figure 3.3) that for N suﬃciently
large, the level of conﬁdence c as a function of ρ, evolves according to a strongly
S-shaped curve around the break-even value ρ = 1. This indicates that the
bias detection will operate in an almost binary fashion, i.e., either c ≈ 0
(when σ2(a.I) < μ(a.I)) or c ≈ 1 (if σ2(a.I) > μ(a.I)).
First step: bias by insertion forging or dropping
Both steps of the oracle are based on Algorithm 3. At the beginning of the
ﬁrst step, the server (as an AP) creates a full copy of the set of FPs, named
left . The corresponding part of the aggregation a that is related to all FPs in
left is called aleft . It creates an empty set of suspicious FPs. Thereafter, the
AP performs the Pearson’s test in an iterative manner: during each iteration,
the AP removes the most deviating FP from left and places it into the set
Suspicious . This process is repeated until the number of remaining FPs is less
than 2, or the conﬁdence level falls below a conﬁdence threshold. We deﬁne
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Algorithm 3: Oracle for insertion bias.
Notations:
c: conﬁdence level for step 1
c2: conﬁdence level for step 2
ct: conﬁdence threshold
aleft : aggregation for the set of remaining, not-yet-detected FPs
δi[n] = (a.I[n]− μ(aleft .I))2: deviation of the number of insertions
of FPn from the mean of left .I
δc[n] = (a.C[n]− μ(aleft .C))2: deviation of the number of
contributions of FPn from the mean of left .C
1 detectInsertionBias(k, v)
2 left ← {FP1, . . . ,FPn, . . . ,FPN}
3 Suspicious ← ∅
4 while sizeof(left) ≥ 2 do // Step 1:
5 c ← performPearson(aleft) // See Equation 3.1
6 if c ≥ ct then
// picks the most deviating FP:
7 detected ← FPn : δi[n] ← max(δi)
8 Suspicious ← Suspicious ∪ {detected}
9 left ← left \ {detected}
10 else
11 break
12 while sizeof(left) ≥ 2 do // Step 2:
13 c2 ← performPearson2(aleft) // See Equation 3.2
14 if c2 ≥ ct then
15 detected ← FPn : δc[n] ← max(δc) // most deviating FP
16 Suspicious ← Suspicious ∪ {detected}
17 left ← left \ {detected}
18 else
19 break
20 return Suspicious
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the conﬁdence threshold ct as the minimum conﬁdence level that an iteration
can yield in order to continue the auditing process. When the process yields
less than the conﬁdence threshold, it means that we are less sure than ct that
the distribution is not uniform, and that there has been insertion bias, thus
we stop.
Based on this detection process, we can calculate the probability for an FP
that is not performing any insertion biasing, to be victim of a false positive
as P [e] = E(f)
N
, where P [e] is the probability of an erroneous detection and
E(f) is the expected value of the number of false positives. The probability
of having r false positives is (1− ct)rct (the probability of making r mistakes
and correctly stopping at iteration r + 1). It follows:
P [e] =
1
N
·
(
1(1− ct)ct + 2(1− ct)2ct + · · ·
+(N − 1)(1− ct)N−1ct +N(1− ct)N
)
=
1
N
·
[N−1∑
n=1
(
n(1− ct)nct
)
+N(1− ct)N
]
=
ct(1− ct)
N
N−1∑
n=1
(
n(1− ct)n−1
)
+ (1− ct)N
And since we can apply:
m∑
n=1
n.δn−1 =
1− δm+1
(1− δ)2 −
(m+ 1)δm
1− δ
we obtain:
P [e] =
ct(1− ct)
N
[1− (1− ct)N
c2t
− N(1− ct)
N−1
ct
]
+ (1− ct)N
With N large, components of the form (1− ct)N can be neglected, yielding:
P [e] ≈ ct(1− ct)
N
· 1
c2t
=
1− ct
ctN
We present the evolution of P [e] in Figure 3.4, for varying conﬁdence thresholds
ct and several system size N . We can see in this ﬁgure that the values of P [e]
approach asymptotically to 0 as we increase N . For 50 and more nodes, we
have less than 10% of probability of false positives when ct is more than 20%.
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Figure 3.4: Probability of a false positive vs. the conﬁdence threshold ct.
Second step: bias by insertion tampering
Our second step is based on a variant of the Pearson’s test. The AP performs
this test iteratively until the conﬁdence level is below the threshold ct, as
in step 1, and at each step it adds the most deviating FP to Suspicious
and removes it from left . Here, the assumption on the distribution of the
incoming contribution is not on a multinomial distribution anymore. Indeed,
the a.C vector is the result of the combination of the distribution a.I (which is
multinomial) and the probability distribution of the value of a contribution on
each insertion. This latter distribution is not known a priori. In our evaluation
of the oracle, we used ﬁxed, Gaussian and Zipf (power law where the ith most
popular element out of 100 has a probability P [n] ∝ i−1) distributions. We
present the results for the Zipf distribution as these constitute a worst-case
scenario for the oracle, and is more representative of the target application
context.
Let a.C be a combination of the multinomial distribution a.I with a given
distribution F (x). The resulting mean μ(a.C) and variance σ2(a.C) are the
following:
μ(a.C) = μ(F ) · μ(a.I), and
σ2(a.C) =
a.i
N
(
μ(F 2) +
1
N
(μ(F ))2
)
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For large N , σ2(a.I) ≈ a.i
N
and σ2(a.C) ≈ a.i
N
μ(F 2), where μ(F ) =
a.c
a.i
is
the mean of contributions per insertion and μ(F 2) =
a.s
a.i
is the mean of the
squares of contributions per insertion.
As for the previous step, the ratio ρ between variance and mean aﬀects
the conﬁdence level. Let ρ2 be the ratio between the variance and the mean,
used in the calculation of c, the conﬁdence factor, for this second step of
the test. Noteworthy, ρ2 can be computed from the ρ used in the ﬁrst step
and observations on F . Since μ(a.C) and σ2(a.C) change by a factor of μ(F )
and μ(F 2) respectively, we need to correct T in order to position again the
break-even point of ρ at 1.
ρ2 =
σ2(a.C)
μ(a.C)
=
μ(F 2) · a.i
N
μ(F ) · a.i
N
=
μ(F 2)
μ(F )
· ρ
We thus need to use the following correction factor to compute the conﬁ-
dence level in the test of this second step [13]: ρ
ρ2
= μ(F )
μ(F 2)
, which yields the
ﬁnal conﬁdence level c2:
c2 = cdf [χ
2
N−1]
(
N · σ
2(a.C)
μ(a.C)
· μ(F )
μ(F 2)
)
c2 = cdf [χ
2
N−1]
(
N · σ
2(a.C)
μ(a.C)
· a.c
a.s
)
(3.2)
3.5 Auditing mechanisms for aggregation bias
The aggregation bias oracle also performs in two steps, and it is depicted in
Algorithm 4. The ﬁrst step checks the expected distribution with respect to
the shadow distribution based on the insertions, while the second looks at
the distribution of contributions.
First step: bias by insertion forging or dropping
We are interested in determining if the number of insertions reported by the
main AP and the shadow AP’s corresponds to a correct sampling. For any
insertion received by the AP, there is a probability ϕ that it was also received
56
CHAPTER 3. AUDITING FOR LS-DAS
Algorithm 4: Oracle for aggregation bias.
Notations:
c: conﬁdence level for step 1
c2: conﬁdence level for step 2
ct: conﬁdence threshold
1 DetectAggregationBias(k, v)
// First step:
2 c = performNormal(avk) // See Equation 3.3
3 if c ≥ ct then
4 return susp1
// Second step:
5 c2 = performNormal2(avk) // See Equation 3.4
6 if c ≥ ct then
7 return susp2
8 return no_susp
by AP’. The probability distribution of the value a′.i is thus a binomial,
with its center at a.i · ϕ. For a.i suﬃciently large, the binomial distribution
B(a.i, ϕ) can be approximated by a normal distribution with mean a.i ·ϕ and
variance a.i · ϕ(1− ϕ).
For a.i > 5N , the normal approximation is considered as valid if [13]:
|√ϕ(1− ϕ)−√1−ϕ
ϕ
|
√
a.i
< 0.3
and, if we normalize a′.i by subtracting the mean a.i·ϕ and dividing by the
square root of the variance
√
a.i · ϕ(1− ϕ), we obtain: z = a
′.i− a.i · ϕ√
a.i · ϕ(1− ϕ)
that approximately follows a standard normal distribution N (0, 1).
Thus, the value:
c = 2cdf [N0,1]
( | a′.i− a.i · ϕ |√
a.i · ϕ(1− ϕ)
)
− 1 (3.3)
represents the level of conﬁdence that a′.i does not follow a normal distribu-
tion [11] N (a.i ·ϕ, a.i ·ϕ(1−ϕ)) and thus AP has not reported a trustworthy
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a.i value.
Second step: bias by insertion tampering
For any population of values X with size a.i, and any size a′.i random samples
x drawn from X without replacement, we have:
σ2(μ(x)) =
σ2(x)
a′.i
·
(
1− a
′.i
a.i
)
where
σ2(x) =
( a′.i∑
j=1
(
x[j]2
a′.i
− μ(x)2)
) a′.i
a′.i− 1, and
μ(x) =
∑a′.i
j=1 x[j]
a′.i
is an unbiased estimator of σ2(μ(x)). Therefore, for a′.i large enough,
z =
μ(x)− μ(X)√
σ2(μ(x))
approximately follows a standard normal distribution
N (0, 1) [11]. With this additional result, a shadow AP’ can compute the
conﬁdence level c that AP has not reported trustworthy a.i and a.c values:
c2 = 2cdf [N0,1]
(
| μ(a′.C)− μ(a.C) |√
σ′2(a′.C)
a′.i
·
(
1− a
′.i
a.i
)
)
− 1 (3.4)
where σ′2(a′.C) =
(
σ2(a′.C)
) a′.i
a′.i− 1.
Of course, if σ2(x) is equal to 0, this estimator does not work. In this
case, since the variance is 0, it means that all insertions of the sample contain
an equal number of contributions. We can use the same model as in the ﬁrst
step, thus:
c = 2cdf [N0,1]
( | a′.c− a.c · ϕ |√
a.s · ϕ(1− ϕ)
)
− 1 (3.5)
If several shadow AP’s are used, the suspicion will be based on a majority
voting amongst their respective auditing results, with the leverage of a quorum-
based technique. The use of several shadow AP’s avoids that a single AP’
can trigger fake suspicions to incriminate an AP.
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3.6 Evaluation
We present in this section the evaluation of CADA oracles.
Experimental settings
These results were obtained by simulating 200 servers performing the role
of FPs, one server AP(k) (henceforth called simply AP) responsible for the
accumulator avk, and one shadow AP’1(k) (henceforth called AP’) for the
aggregation bias oracle. We use only one AP’ in our experiments to focus on
the auditing process and leave the complexity of the agreement protocol to
quorum-based techniques. For the experiments that evaluate the performance
of the insertion bias oracle, a subset of 40 of the 200 nodes attempt to bias
the aggregation, all in the same manner.
As the communication cost is not important in these experiments, processes
were run in our local cluster. Yet, the implementation is full-featured and
can readily be deployed in large networks. CADA was developed in Lua [65]
and C language, and it uses SPLAY [82] libraries.
Insertion bias oracle
In our ﬁrst experiment, we observe how the conﬁdence threshold aﬀects the
accuracy of the Pearson’s goodness-of-ﬁt test. Figure 3.5 presents averaged
results from 5,000 experiments with a network of 200 nodes. We consider
a scenario where no server attempts to bias the insertions. Before doing
the tests, we aggregate 5,000 contributions per FP (for a total of 1,000,000
contributions). One curve shows the result of performing only one iteration
of the ﬁrst step of the insertion bias oracle (i.e., one Pearson test), while the
other curve shows the result of performing one Pearson test from the second
step of the same oracle. Contributions on each of the insertions follow a 1-100
Zipf distribution (in the 1 to 100 range, and value 1 is 100 times more popular
than 100). On the vertical axis we present the percentage of cases where the
chi-square test yields a false positive. On the horizontal axis we measure the
conﬁdence threshold (on percentage levels) required to trigger a suspicion.
As the chi-square test establishes, the expected behavior of both curves is
to be linearly dependent on the conﬁdence threshold: if the oracle requires
80% of conﬁdence that the distribution is not multinomial and uniform, it is
expected that the test will yield false positives 20% of the times in practice.
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Figure 3.5: Performance of the insertion bias oracle when no FP introduces bias.
The graph shows the evaluation of the two steps.
As expected, the curves evolve in a linear way, starting from almost 100% at
0% conﬁdence threshold and decreasing to 0% at 100% conﬁdence threshold.
Figures 3.6(a) and 3.6(b) show the probability for a non-biasing FP to
be victim of a false positive and the probability for a biasing FP to not
be detected (false negative), depending on the conﬁdence threshold. In our
network of 200 nodes, 40 (20% of the population) introduce a bias in insertions
while the remaining 160 (80%) have no bias. In order to test the ﬁrst step of
the oracle, the bias in Figure 3.6(a) is performed only through duplication of
insertions. For testing the second step, the bias in Figure 3.6(b) is performed
only through duplication of contributions on the insertions. Contributions
for each insertion follow a 1-100 Zipf distribution. All FPs introduce bias
with the same probability. Results from experiments where FPs insert a
negative bias (dropping insertions instead of duplicating them, or setting the
contributions of insertions to 0) reﬂected similar results and are not shown
due to space constraints.
Both graphs show averaged results from 100 experiments. For each
experiment, the insertion bias oracle is activated after collecting 500 insertions
for each FP, which corresponds to 100,000 insertions in a situation where
no FP performs insertion bias. The percentages that accompany the legends
represent the global impact of the insertion bias on the totals (on a.i in the
case of Figure 3.6(a) and on a.c in the case of Figure 3.6(b)). This means,
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Figure 3.6: Performance of the insertion bias oracle when 20% of the FPs intro-
duce bias. Plots show false positive and negative rates vs. conﬁdence threshold.
Percentages on the legend represent the global impact of the bias on the aggregation.
for example in Figure 3.6(a), that for a 34% bias level, the AP held about
134,000 insertions in total, about 34,000 of them coming from the 40 biasing
FPs.
The probability of a false positive is expected to decrease in a non-linear
way, since it is not the result of one chi-square test, but the result of an
iteration of tests (see Figure 3.4). The probability of a false negative is
expected to grow at a steeper pace in the case of Figure 3.6(b), because we
apply a correction of the variance on the formulas, since the distribution to
which the vector a.C is compared is no longer a multinomial but the result of
a multinomial combined with the distribution of the contributions (Zipf in
our case). Since the evolution of false positives does not depend on how much
the biasing FPs alter the total, it should be the same for all cases. We observe
that this assumption does indeed apply in practice, since the false positive
evolution is kept similar no matter how high the bias level. We thus show
only one curve for false positives, in the scenario where the global impact is
equivalent to 20%.
The graphs clearly show that the probability for a biasing FP of not being
detected grows with larger conﬁdence threshold. As expected, the higher the
bias level, the higher the probability of being detected for a biasing server, and
thus, the lower the probability of false negatives. We can conclude that the
choice of the conﬁdence threshold represents a compromise between correctly
detecting a biasing FP and not falsely accusing non-biasing FPs in the process.
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Interestingly, the curves cross at low percentage values in both graphs (below
5%).
Aggregation bias oracle
Figure 3.7(a) shows the inﬂuence of the conﬁdence threshold on the perfor-
mance of the oracle. On these experiments, averaged from 5,000 runs, neither
the AP nor the shadow AP’ introduce aggregation bias. The oracle acts after
the aggregation of 500,000 contributions on the AP. All FPs send a copy
of an insertion to the shadow AP’ with a probability of ϕ =20%. For the
evaluation of the second step, contributions on each of the insertions follow
a 1-100 Zipf distribution. The ﬁgure presents the percentage of cases where
the test yields a false positive as a function of the conﬁdence threshold (in
terms of percentage) required to trigger a suspicion. Since we can never tell
with 100% of certainty that a server is biasing the aggregations (because of
the probabilistic nature of the distributions), what we can provide is a conﬁ-
dence level: a level of certainty that such assumption is correct. Figures 3.5
and 3.7(a) conﬁrm in fact that the theoretical conﬁdence levels are correctly
reﬂected in the number of false positives.
For instance, with 80% conﬁdence that the totals in AP do not correspond
to the sample in the shadow AP’, the test yields false positives approximately
20% of the times in practice.
In Figure 3.7(b) we show the impact of the number of insertions aggregated
before performing the tests, for the second step of the aggregation bias oracle.
In this scenario the servers do not introduce any bias. We measure the
probability of a false positive when increasing the number of insertions. Since
both the expected value and the variance of the evaluated aggregation reach a
stable value when the number of samples tends to inﬁnity, we expect the results
of the test to stabilize after a given number of aggregated insertions. The graph
clearly shows that, after 10,000 insertions, the probability reaches a lower
bound whose value depends on the conﬁdence threshold (see Figure 3.7(a)).
The incidence of false positives in the cases where the conﬁdence threshold is
set to 80% and 95% respectively stabilizes at 20% and 5%. The graph also
shows the impact of changing the shadowing ratio ϕ. As expected, the ﬁgure
conﬁrms that larger shadowing ratios produce more accurate tests. Indeed,
the probability of false positives stabilizes faster for a shadowing ratio of 40%
than for 20%, and convergence is even faster for 80%.
In Figures 3.8(a) and 3.8(b), we show the probability that the oracle
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Figure 3.7: Performance of the aggregation bias oracle when AP does not introduce
bias.
detects a biasing AP. The probability of detecting the AP is expected to grow
and approach 100% as AP introduces a higher bias. In these experiments, we
use two models of bias: the AP can either manipulate insertions or manipulate
their contributions, which allows us to test the ﬁrst (see Figure 3.8(a)) and
second (see Figure 3.8(b)) steps, respectively.
When the AP drops an insertion or sets its contribution to 0, it produces a
negative impact on the component a.c (and also on a.i in the case of dropping
the insertion). This eﬀect can be observed in the left side of the ﬁgures. When
the AP duplicates an insertion or doubles its contribution, it introduces a
positive bias by increasing a.c. This appears on the right side. The graphs
present results from experiments on 5,000 insertions aggregated on the AP.
Each value is an average over 1,000 runs. A sample equivalent to 20% of the
insertions is sent the shadow AP’, and the AP introduces biases from -20%
to 20%.
Both graphs show a higher likelihood for a server to be detected when
increasing the bias level, on either the negative or the positive side. The
curve is symmetric, which results from the detection method that eﬀectively
measures the absolute deviation from the expected amount of insertions. The
graphs shows three curves for conﬁdence thresholds of 95%, 80%, and 60%.
One can observe that, in practice, there is a bias threshold from which a
biasing AP will be detected with probability of almost 100%, which meets
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Figure 3.8: Performance of the aggregation bias oracle when AP introduces bias.
our objective. It is important to notice that the minimum values of the
curves coincide with the detection probability obtained when the AP does
not perform any bias, as shown in Figure 3.7.
3.7 Related work
CADA provides an application-speciﬁc auditing framework that ensures a
form of low-overhead fraud detection. The suspicions of misbehavior can be
leveraged to ensure some conﬁdence on the aggregated data. It operates by
means of statistical tests between the expected behavior of servers and the
observed one. Other aggregation layers and protocols for large-scale systems
include probabilistic techniques to deal with the loss of data elements [62],
an orthogonal problem to the accountability of the aggregation servers, or
top-k aggregation mechanisms [90].
CADA can be seen as a form of probabilistic failure detector [20] that
is specialized for the aggregation operation. Byzantine failure detectors [69]
in the context of agreement protocols also produce suspicions of detectable
misbehavior but under a more general model of Byzantine behavior. Their
generality does however come at a much higher price than the application-
speciﬁc detection of CADA. In [5], the authors propose to detect byzantine
server failures in the context of a replicated database service. The system
gathers statistics about the number of faulty servers and their impact on
client requests, which can be seen as a common feature to CADA’s oracles
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mechanisms.
CADA, when coupled with trust or blacklist management, also constitutes
an incentive mechanism for preventing servers from deviating from the protocol
speciﬁcation. Such incentive mechanisms are typically used to prevent free-
riding [30,94]. Similarly to CADA, they are application-speciﬁc and tailored
to a particular kind of Byzantine behavior. Incentive mechanisms however
typically only consider the lack of service from free-riders, whereas CADA
also considers the case where nodes wish to serve compromised data.
CADA ﬁnally relates to accountability mechanisms for distributed systems.
The PeerReview [53] accountability framework checks the conformance of a
distributed protocol to its speciﬁcation as a deterministic state machine, by
logging the message sent and received by each node and having them replayed
by an external (witness) node against the state machine. PeerReview targets
general accountability and, as opposed to CADA, does not take into account
the speciﬁcities of the operation implemented by the protocol. This leads
to a high overhead both in terms of memory and computation, and puts
strong requirements on the protocol. The focus of CADA is diﬀerent in that
it tolerates some limited deviant behavior from a server in the aggregation
layer before issuing a suspicion. Note also that, unlike PeerReview, CADA
does not log the network activity for each node and as such cannot support
veriﬁable evidence of misbehavior.
CATS [128] is another accountability mechanism that, similarly to CADA
is application speciﬁc (it targets a storage service). Similarly to the AP
auditing mechanism of CADA, CATS checks the legitimacy of insertions and
modiﬁcations to the stored elements, but does so in a comprehensive manner,
checking all incoming messages as in PeerReview. This results in a larger
overhead than with the node-local operations performed by CADA oracles.
Since CADA is a heuristic auditing system (it does not check every message
sent or received like PeerReview or CATS), it is lightweight and highly scalable.
In fact, tests in Section 3.6 show that increasing the rate of insertions or
contributions improves the accuracy of the system, without any compromise
on computing load, because the statistics that the system use are performed
on the aggregation, not on individual insertions.
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3.8 Summary
The aggregation of distributions is a fundamental component of many large-
scale distributed applications. However, in order to enforce the liability of a
service based on aggregation, such as a monitoring infrastructure, a feedback
aggregation and recommendation layer, or a trust management system, some
guarantees on the good behavior of the servers collaboratively providing the
service must be enforced. In particular, it is necessary to discourage biasing
behaviors where a node in the aggregation layer may want to compromise either
the distributions it maintains or the distribution maintained by others. In this
chapter, we presented the CADA oracles, which consider two misbehaviors
that servers may implement: insertion and aggregation biasing. The oracles
assess the probability of correct behavior of the servers according to statistical
tests over the distributions of information at aggregation peers and as received
from clients. Based on these tests, CADA issues suspicions for servers that
deviate from the expected behavior observed in the rest of the system.
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Chapter 4
Framework for the evaluation of
Distributed File Storage Service
prototypes
4.1 Introduction
At present, the research community lacks tools that facilitate the development,
testing, and benchmarking of Distributed File Storage Services (DFSSs), and
that can compare the advantages and disadvantages of tweaking properties
of the underlying algorithms, e.g., consistency model, number of replicas, or
block size.
As it was mentioned in Section 1.2, practical DFSSs propose not only
diﬀerent File System Consistency Levels (FSCLs), but they also have diﬀerent
base performance and optimization levels. This makes diﬃcult to perform a
fair benchmark comparing diﬀerent FSCLs.
In this chapter we introduce FlexiFS, a ﬂexible distributed ﬁle system
framework for the fast prototyping and benchmarking of distributed ﬁle
systems, based on the open-source SPLAY [82] platform.
We make a step toward allowing the systematic comparison of DFSS
designs. We instantiate our approach by isolating and evaluating the impact
of the FSCL on performance.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, we
explain concepts that are needed for the understanding of our design. We
introduce and explain the design of FlexiFS in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we
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present the six diﬀerent FSCLs that FlexiFS oﬀers. Section 4.5 presents the
algorithms that correspond to each of the six FSCLs. Section 4.6 describes the
implementation and deployment of FlexiFS as part of the SPLAY platform.
We present in Section 4.7 several benchmark results that evaluate each FSCL.
Section 4.8 leads the discussion of other work related to the topic. We ﬁnally
summarize in Section 4.9.
4.2 Background
The CAP Theorem
As seen in Section 1.1, replication is used in Large-Scale Distributed Storage
Systems (LS-DSSs) as a mean to address challenges such as permanent storage
and high availability. The use of replication raises new challenges, such as
how to maintain consistency between replicas.
An ideal LS-DSS would have full consistency and full availability, i.e.,
when an update is made, all observers can see immediately that update. It
will be explained below that this is impossible to achieve. Database systems
in the late 70s experienced this diﬃculty; people working on such systems
knew empirically that there is a trade-oﬀ between these two features, and
leaned towards oﬀering consistency in detriment of availability. This lead to
the conception of the ACID (Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability)
properties in databases, deﬁned by Jim Gray during the 70s, and more
formally presented in 1983 by Theo Haerder and Andreas Reuter [54].
In the 90s large Internet services arose, and for these systems, availability
was the biggest priority. This change in needs derived in the conception of
an alternative model called BASE (Basic Availability, Soft State, Eventual
consistency), which is oriented to systems that aim for high availability.
The ﬁrst time that the trade-oﬀ between availability and consistency was
presented in an explicit way was during the keynote address to the Principles
of Distributed Computing conference (PODC) in 2000. Professor Eric Brewer
from the University of California at Berkeley presented in this keynote the
CAP Theorem. The theorem was later presented in a more formal way in an
article by Seth Gilbert and Nancy Lynch [52].
There are three properties a distributed system can provide:
Consistency: Full consistency is achieved if, for all operations, there is a
total order such that each operation looks as if it were completed at a single
68
CHAPTER 4. FRAMEWORK FOR THE EVALUATION OF DFSS
PROTOTYPES
instant. This is the same as to say that for a distributed system, operations
must look as if they are executed in a single node. Full consistency is
not achieved if, for example, a read operation that was executed by the
system after a write operation retrieves a value that is prior to this write.
Availability: Full availability means that every request that is handled by a
non-faulty node must have a response. It also means that every algorithm
that is used by the system must eventually terminate.
Partition tolerance: A network is partitioned when all communication
between a set of nodes and another set of nodes of the network is completely
interrupted. To be partition tolerant, a network must still function even
if all messages sent from one partition (set of nodes) to another are lost.
Brewer stated during his keynote that a distributed system can achieve at
most two out of these three properties. Gilbert and Lynch presented in their
article a formal proof of this statement. The theorem has served as base for
distributed systems design since its conception and up to this day.
Systems that forfeit Partition tolerance are called CA, because they oﬀer
Consistency and Availability. Examples of such systems are traditional cluster
and single-site databases, non-distributed ﬁle systems, and distributed systems
such as Greenplum [123], Vertica [75].
Systems that oﬀer Consistency and Partition tolerance are for example
Google’s BigTable [21] and Spanner [29], Apache HBase [8] and Oracle
Berkeley DB [98].
AP (Availability and Partition tolerance) systems are for example Amazon
Dynamo [33], LinkedIn Voldemort [103], Yahoo! PNUTS [28], and Apache
Cassandra [74].
Nowadays, large-scale systems are often composed of hundreds or thou-
sands of nodes (which are prone to failures), and spread across several data
centers, which can be geographically separated, even by large distances.
Therefore, network partition is a scenario that designers of such systems often
consider. Thus, most distributed systems ﬁt either into the CP or the AP
model.
The CAP theorem was revised in 2012 by Brewer himself [14]. In this
article, Brewer states that the “two out of three” condition is often used in a
too stric way, and that is a vast range of ﬂexibility for handling partitions
and recovering from them.
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Nowadays, several algorithms are used to provide diﬀerent guarantees
along the CP to AP spectrum. We explain below Vector Clocks and Paxos,
which are the ones implemented in FlexiFS.
Vector Clocks
Vector clocks is an algorithm for generating partial ordering of events and de-
tecting causality violations. The algorithm was developed by Colin Fidge [44]
and Friedemann Mattern [86] in an independent manner, in 1988. The sce-
nario for vector clocks is a set of processes that can exchange information
only through messages. When a process sends a message, it sends the state
of its own logical clock. A vector clock for a set of N processes is an array of
N logical clocks.
The logical clocks are actually counters that start at value 0 and behave
according to the following rules:
1. When a process experiences an event, it increments its logical clock by
one.
2. Each time a process sends a message, it increments its logical clock by
one and then sends the entire vector with the message.
3. Upon receiving a message, a process increments its logical clock by one
and updates its vector by taking the maximums between the values in
its own vector clock and the vector in the message.
By following these rules, processes can keep track of events, and thus, can
compare, through the events timestamps, if two events are causally related,
and if so, which one occurred ﬁrst.
Vector clocks is used in several distributed systems (e.g., Amazon Dy-
namo [33], Apache Cassandra [74]) to achieve causal consistency (a variety of
eventual consistency) among replicas.
The Paxos algorithm
Leslie Lamport proposed Paxos as a family of protocols for solving consensus
between unreliable processes. Although similar work on the topic was already
done [12, 39, 113], Lamport was the ﬁrst to present a resilient consensus
protocol for asynchronous networks, with a proof of correctness.
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Proposer LearnerAcceptors
prepare
accept
…
Figure 4.1: Failure-free execution of the Basic Paxos protocol.
Paxos was formally introduced in 1998 [77]. However, Lamport developed
it and used it since the late 80s. Lamport described the algorithm through a
ﬁctional parliament established in the greek Paxos islands. He wrote a more
concise description in 2001 [78].
The scenario for the Paxos algorithm is a network of processes that are
prompt to crash-recover failures, and need to agree upon a given value. These
processes were depicted by Lamport as Greek legislators that worked part-
time, and thus could leave the parliament at any time, and for an unbounded
amount of time.
In order to describe the Paxos algorithm, we deﬁne the following roles:
• Proposer: proposes the request to other nodes, and coordinates the
progression of the protocol.
• Acceptor: receives proposals from the Proposer and determines whether
to accept or not the aforementioned proposals.
• Learner: receives the instruction from an Acceptor to store values.
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The failure-free execution of the Basic Paxos protocol is depicted in
Figure 4.1. The Proposer sends a prepare message to all other processes,
which act as Acceptors. The Acceptor will check if the Proposal ID that
comes with the message is higher than any proposal that was already agreed
upon. If this is the case, the Acceptor replies promise with the values of the
proposals it has accepted. If not, the Acceptor replies reject prepare and the
highest proposal ID that it is aware of.
If the Proposer receives a suﬃcient quorum of promise messages (typically,
half of the nodes plus 1), it will proceed with the propagation of an accept
message, that is sent to each of the Acceptors that responded positively. Upon
reception of an accept, an Acceptor checks again if the proposal ID is still
higher than any other accepted proposal. If so, the Acceptor answers accept
OK to the Proposer and also sends a learn message to the Learners.
The transaction is ﬁnished and successful, when a suﬃcient quorum of
processes answers accept OK to the Proposer.
The Paxos algorithm guarantees correctness over liveness. A well-known
scenario where liveness is not guaranteed is the dueling Proposers. In this case,
two processes are trying to propose values, and each process alternatively
interrupts the Paxos algorithm that the other process is executing. This
scenario can go eternally, unless one of the processes decides to wait some
time before sending a new proposal, in order to let the other to ﬁnish.
There are several variants of the Paxos algorithm, which adapt to speciﬁc
scenarios and requirements. Multi-Paxos is an optimization for the case when
the Proposer is usually the same node; in this case, the ﬁrst phase can be
avoided. Cheap Paxos [81] is designed to tolerate f failures; it requires the
presence of f + 1 main and f auxiliary processes. Other variants are Fast
Paxos [80], Byzantine Paxos [19] and Generalized Paxos [79].
The basic operation of Paxos is simple from the point of view of the
application that leverages it. Nodes can propose (put) values, and query for a
value. When a value is returned (get), Paxos guarantees that this is a agreed-
upon value between the nodes participating to the run. Paxos is widely
used in fault-tolerant distributed systems, state machine replication, and
synchronization services (e.g., Google Chubby [15], Apache Zookeeper [63]),
to decide the order of transitions to apply to a deterministic state.
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POSIX File Systems and FUSE
In a general way, a ﬁle system is a process or set of processes that allows to
access a storage device (or a group of storage devices), through items called
ﬁles.
Basically, a ﬁle is an entry in a directory. This entry points to an inode,
which holds the ﬁle metadata. The standard attributes that a POSIX ﬁle has
are the following:
• mode: the ﬁle’s 3-digit access rights (for user, group and others).
• ino: the inode number.
• dev: the device number.
• nlink: number of links (number of ﬁles associated to this inode).
• uid, gid: the inodes user and group IDs.
• size: ﬁle size in bytes.
• atime, mtime, ctime: date and time of last access, modiﬁcation of
the ﬁle contents, and change in metadata, respectively.
They inode does not keep the ﬁle data itself, but pointers to blocks that
contain the data. However, an inode can be associated to several ﬁles; these
ﬁles are to be called “hard linked”.
Directories contain lists of ﬁles : a character string (the ﬁle name), linked
to a pointer to the corresponding inode. POSIX ﬁle systems always have a
root directory, which starts the directory hierarchy and is represented by the
symbol “/”.
The manipulation of a ﬁle in POSIX ﬁle systems is session oriented;
read and write operations are always enclosed with an open and a release
operation. On the other hand, between and open and a release operation,
there is the concept of a “session”, where many reads and writes can occur.
POSIX ﬁle systems normally reside in the kernel space, as they have the
goal to achieve optimal performance through direct access to the machine’s
resources. However, developing in user space has some advantages (e.g., the
ﬁle system is easier to develop and to debug, no kernel recompilation is needed,
bugs do not take down the entire system). Because of these reasons, a need
for user space ﬁle systems emerged.
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Figure 4.2: General architecture of FlexiFS.
File System in User Space (FUSE) is a framework that allows to create a
ﬁle system with code written entirely in user space. It was originally developed
to support AVFS [1], but it is currently a separate project. FUSE is currently
available for several operating systems, such as Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD,
Minix 3, Android and MacOS X.
The framework is composed of a kernel module, a user space library and a
mount utility. The kernel module is loaded in privileged mode, and it comes
with the Linux kernel since version 2.6.14. The user space library oﬀers a set
of functions that are called when the user accesses ﬁles in the ﬁle system. We
present in Table 4.1 an excerpt of the most important FUSE operations and
their expected behavior.
Our use of FUSE will be described with more detail in Section 4.3.
4.3 FlexiFS design and architecture
FlexiFS is a DFSS oﬀering a transparent ﬁle system interface. Figure 4.2
illustrates its general architecture. FlexiFS has been built in a modular way
to allow evaluation of diﬀerent choices of DFSS designs. A typical deployment
1Since several processes can open concurrently the same ﬁle, it is convenient to keep a
counter instead of a true/false ﬂag.
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Operation Expected behavior
create Receives a ﬁle name as argument. If a ﬁle with such name does
not exist, creates an inode for an empty ﬁle and leaves it open (a
special open_sessions counter1 is initialized to 1).
mkdir (Make Directory). Creates a directory.
getattr (Get Attributes). Retrieves all the standard ﬁle metadata used
by the operating system. One can always store extra metadata
inside an inode if wanted, but only standard information will be
retrieved by getattr.
open Retrieves the inode and increments the number of open sessions
(for a closed ﬁle, open_sessions = 0).
read Reads bytes from an open ﬁle. In fact, the operation is provided
already an inode structure (which is retrieved during an open or
create operation), so, it is not necessary to retrieve the inode
again from the storage facility.
write Writes a sequence of bytes to an open ﬁle. An oﬀset is speciﬁed.
If the length of the chain plus the oﬀset is bigger than the original
ﬁle size, the ﬁle size is increased to ﬁt the sequence.
truncate Deletes all bytes of an open ﬁle, starting from a speciﬁed byte
index. If the byte index is bigger than the ﬁle size, then no byte
is deleted, and 0s are appended in order to ﬁt the new size.
flush Forces changes in memory to be written to the physical storage.
release Decrements the number of open sessions. If it reaches 0, writes on
physical storage all the metadata changes (dates, block list, etc.)
from the current session, in order to close the ﬁle.
rename Changes the name of a ﬁle. Equivalent to a “move” operation.
link Creates a ﬁle which points to the inode speciﬁed in the arguments.
It does not create a new inode.
unlink Deletes a ﬁle; if the inode that this ﬁle is pointing to does not
have any other ﬁle associated to it, it deletes the inode too, and
optionally the blocks associated to the inode.
symlink Creates a ﬁle and its corresponding inode; inside the inode, instead
of creating a list of blocks, it places a pointer to another ﬁle.
Table 4.1: Important FUSE operations.
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contains two sets of nodes: Storage Nodes implement a distributed ﬂat storage
layer, while client nodes present a ﬁle system abstraction to the users, and
store ﬁle and directory hierarchies on the Storage Nodes.
The user has access to the ﬁles through a ﬁle system based on the FUSE
module (see Section 4.2).
Proxy
In FlexiFS, each access to the ﬁle system is transformed into a HTTP/REST
instruction (GET, PUT, DELETE methods over HTTP), and routed toward
a Proxy node that acts as an entry point to the distributed storage system.
The Proxy redirects requests to the adequate Storage Node(s), which store or
return data blocks.
Thanks to the use of a RESTful API, the Proxy can be implemented with
any lightweight HTTP server. Other well-known services that oﬀer RESTful
interfaces are CouchDB [7], Amazon S3 [6] and MongoDB [92], for example.
The role of the Proxy is to hide the topology of the distributed storage
from the client. In FlexiFS, any Storage Node can act as a Proxy. Therefore,
for clients to have access to FlexiFS, they must only know the IP address
of one of the Storage Nodes. This information can be easily provided by a
DNS server, for example. When a client executes an operation and contacts a
Proxy via its Web service interface, the Proxy accesses the underlying storage
system, executes the operation, and returns the result to the client.
Distributed Storage Layer
FlexiFS is modular and decouples the ﬁle system logic from the actual storage.
The storage layer is essentially a key/value store extended with a Compare-
and-Swap (CAS) primitive. Devising a ﬁle system on top of this interface is
a contribution of our work. The operations of the interface are as follows:
• put(k, v): writes the value v for key k,
• get(k): returns the data stored for key k,
• cas(k, u, v): checks whether the stored value is still u, and if so, replaces
u by v; in any case the old value is returned,
• delete(k): removes the element with key k.
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Depending on the ﬁle system consistency level in use in FlexiFS, the
semantics of the above interface may change. For instance, CAS is not atomic
under eventual consistency. We detail how FlexiFS implements this interface
in Section 4.5.
The storage layer supports data indexing. Due to its modular design,
FlexiFS is able to use diﬀerent indexing and storage layers, such as a multi-hop
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) or a central server. We detail below a common
design in existing ﬂat storage layers [33, 74], that we also use here.
FlexiFS’ indexing and storage layer is a simple yet eﬃcient one-hop DHT
structured as a ring that relies on consistent hashing [67] to store and locate
data. Figure 4.2 presents its general architecture. It supports the following
features:
Routing. For performance reasons and in order to reduce noise in our
experiments, we have chosen a one-hop routing design, i.e., every node
knows all other nodes in the ring.
Elasticity. Upon joining, a node chooses a random identiﬁer along the ring
and fetches the ring structure from some other DHT node. It then informs
its two direct neighbors that it is joining.
Storage. FlexiFS uses consistent hashing to assign blocks to nodes with
replication factor r: a block with a key k is stored at the r nodes whose
identiﬁers follow k on the ring.
Failure detection. Each node periodically checks the availability of its
closest successor on the ring, and repair mechanisms are triggered upon a
lack of response within a timeout.
A gossip mechanism spreads topological changes throughout the ring.
Each node notiﬁes its closest neighbor whenever it learns about a leave/join
event. If the time to spread a message along the ring is shorter than the time
between two leave/join events, this mechanism is guaranteed to maintain
the ring topology. In our experience, such an assumption is reasonable for a
deployment size of a few hundred Storage Nodes or less (our typical testbed
size). For larger network sizes, this simple gossiping mechanism can be
replaced with more complex mechanisms [48,66,122].
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iblock: /
(metadata)
============
bin
home
iblock: /bin
(metadata)
============
ls
iblock: /home
(metadata)
============
(empty dir)
iblock: /bin/ls
(metadata)
============
b4
b8
dblock: b4
011001001001
000110100…
dblock: b8
011001001001
000110100…
Figure 4.3: Example of a ﬁle system structure stored in FlexiFS.
File System
Like most contemporary DFSSs, FlexiFS decouples metadata from data
storage. For each ﬁle, an inode block (iblock hereafter) contains the metadata
information about the ﬁle, e.g., size and user/group ownership. One or more
data blocks (dblocks) hold the content of the ﬁle. FlexiFS provides several
hooks to tune how ﬁles are stored.
Figure 4.3 illustrates our current design: dblocks are of constant and
conﬁgurable size. The default size of dblocks is 128 kB, matching the
maximal payload size for FUSE read and write operations. If an iblock
represents a regular ﬁle, it contains, along with metadata, the list of dblocks
that are associated to that ﬁle. An iblock representing a directory contains
the list of ﬁles that reside in the directory. Compared to the typical redirection-
based architecture of Unix, the above mechanisms help reducing the network
overhead [51].
Both iblocks and dblocks are represented as elements of the same key/-
value store, where they get replicated according to the diﬀerent consistency
models. Only iblocks are mutable. The key of a dblock is equal to the hash
of its content. This ensures good balancing of the data across Storage Nodes in
order to deliver aggregate performance and increased fault tolerance. In case
of an iblock, the client generates a unique key at creation time, based on a
hash of the concatenation of the session number and an incremental sequence
number. The session number is system-wide unique, and it is obtained when
the ﬁle system is mounted. Session numbers are issued and managed by a
central authority.
FlexiFS has several built-in sharing semantics and their corresponding
implementations, which we describe in the next section. Additional semantics
can be easily added thanks to FlexiFS’ modular design.
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Amazon S3 API
As mentioned before, the Proxy presents a RESTful API to the client. This
API is compatible with the Amazon S3 [6] API. Amazon S3 stands for Simple
Storage Service, and it is a distributed storage service that arranges items
by buckets and keys. A bucket is a repository of objects, identiﬁed with a
unique name. A key is the identiﬁcation for an object. A key must be unique
only within a bucket. Amazon S3 is nowadays one of the most popular online
storage services.
4.4 File System Consistency Levels
An important design aspect for a DFSS is deﬁning the semantics of sharing,
i.e., how clients accessing simultaneously the same ﬁle observe modiﬁcations
by other clients.
In Section 4.2, we have made an overview of the CAP theorem and several
mechanisms to keep consistency between replicas. In this section, we describe
several consistency levels and their relation with DFSS.
Overview
In Section 1.1, we deﬁned a DFSS as a distributed storage system where
clients perceive the data as a local ﬁle system. This deﬁnition leads us to
separate DFSS functionally in two parts: (i) the innards of the DFSS, i.e., a
key/value store; and (ii) the front-end to the client, i.e., a ﬁle system.
According to this distinction, we classify the semantics of sharing with
• the consistency level from the key/value store perspective, and
• the use (or not) of the close-to-open semantics (point of view of the ﬁle
system).
The combination of these two parameters deﬁnes a FSCL.
Consistency levels at the key/value store
The three consistency levels at the key/value store are the following:
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Consistency of
File Operations Example Implementations
Linearizability
b
r
rename(f, f ′) 0
rename(f, f ′′) -1 POSIX [64]
Sequential
Consistency
b
r
w(f, f1) w(g, g1)
r(g) g1 r(f) f0
Sprite [96],
GoogleFS [51],
HDFS [45]
Eventual
Consistency
b
r
w(f, f1) r(f) f2
w(f, f2) r(f) f1 Pastis [16]
(a) Without close-to-open semantics.
Consistency of
File Operations Example Implementations
Linearizability
b
r
o cw(f, f1) r(g) g0
o cw(g, g2) r(f) f0
AFS [61],
NFS [118]
Sequential
Consistency
b
r
o cw(f, f1)
o cr(f) f0 SinfoniaFS [4]
Eventual
Consistency
b
r
o cw(f, f1)
o cr(f) f1 o cr(f) f0
Coda [111],
Ivy [93]
(b) With close-to-open semantics.
Figure 4.4: File System Consistency Levels (operation w(f, v) means a write to
ﬁle f with value v; r(f) is a read on f ; o and c respectively open and close all ﬁles
accessed during the session).
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Linearizability. The most powerful synchronization level for processes in a
distributed environment is obtained through the use of atomic, or linearizable,
objects [57]. A linearizable object is a shared object that provides the illusion
of being accessed locally. More precisely, this consistency level states that each
operation takes eﬀect instantaneously at some point between its invocation
and response.
Figure 4.4(a) presents an execution of linearizable operations. The blue
client (represented also with the letter b) renames ﬁle f to f ′. Concurrently,
the red client (r) renames ﬁle f to f ′′. Since operations are linearizable, one
of the two accesses must fail.
A common way to implement linearizability is to use the Paxos [77]
algorithm (see Section 4.2, which provides consensus among all replicas of
any key/value record, for each read and write operation.
Sequential Consistency. Under sequential consistency, “the result of any
execution is the same as if the operations of all the processors were executed
in some sequential order, and the operations of each individual processor
appear in this sequence in the order speciﬁed by its program” [76]. Sequential
consistency is weaker than linearizability. In particular, this consistency level
is not composable [57]: even if each ﬁle is sequentially consistent, the ﬁle
system as a whole is not sequentially consistent (this is also called the hidden
channel problem). We illustrate this issue in Figure 4.4(b) (middle). In
this ﬁgure, accesses with respect to ﬁle f are sequentially consistency, and
similarly this property holds for g. However, the execution (i.e., when we
consider both f and g as a whole) is not sequentially consistent.
A way to implement sequential consistency is using primary replication.
For each record, a primary replica is elected. Upon a put(k, v) call, the
primary for key k sends to all replicas the value v and then waits until a
majority of replicas acknowledges the reception before returning to the proxy.
To execute a get(k) call, the proxy accesses any replica of k that contains
the version it previously read, or a newer version.
Eventual Consistency. Under eventual consistency [41], there must exist
a monotonically growing preﬁx of updates on which correct replicas agree.
Since there is no assumption on the time of convergence, eventual consistency
does not oﬀer any guarantee on the return value of non-stable operations
(that do not belong to the common preﬁx).
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Figure 4.4(b) (bottom) depicts a run under eventual consistency. In this
ﬁgure, both b and r clients write then read ﬁle f . Because the r client reads
version f2 while the b client reads version f1, no linearization of the four
operations can satisfy the returned values.
Close-to-Open Semantics
Under POSIX semantics, almost all ﬁle operations shall be linearizable [64,
page 58]. In particular, a read shall see the eﬀects of all previous writes
performed on the same ﬁle. The CAP impossibility result [52] tells us that
such constraint hinders the scalability of a DFSS, because it will limit either
the Availability or the Partition tolerance of the system.
By introducing the notion of ﬁle session, close-to-open semantics [109]
aim at reducing the amount of synchrony required to access shared ﬁles. A
ﬁle session is a sequence of read and/or write operations enclosed between an
open and a close2 invocation. It has the following properties [83]:
(1) Writes to an open ﬁle are visible to the client but are invisible to remote
clients having the same ﬁle opened concurrently.
(2) Once the ﬁle is closed, changes are immediately visible to sessions that
are starting afterwards.
Since operations execute in isolation and either all writes or none execute,
these sharing semantics are close to the familiar notion of transaction. Notice,
however, that close-to-open semantics apply the last writer wins rule: two
concurrent updates do not abort, one of them is simply overwritten.
The deﬁnition of close-to-open consistency above has been formulated
with atomicity in mind. One can actually combine close-to-open semantics
with sequential consistency and eventual consistency as well. For sequential
consistency, rule (2) is replaced by:
(2a) There exists a sequential ordering of the sessions such that (i) for every
read in a session, there exists a matching write prior to it, and (ii) reads
are causally ordered on the same client.
For eventual consistency, rule (2) above is replaced by:
2In FUSE, the equivalent of a close operation is the release operation.
82
CHAPTER 4. FRAMEWORK FOR THE EVALUATION OF DFSS
PROTOTYPES
(2b) If at some point in time no more changes occurs, then eventually all
sessions observe the same state of the ﬁle.
Figure 4.4(b) illustrates the combination of close-to-open semantics with
linearizability, sequential, and eventual consistency. Obviously, if a single read
or write operation is executed per session, the consistency level per operation
deﬁnes how sessions behave. In other words, close-to-open semantics have
no eﬀect (e.g., middle row in Figure 4.4(b)). Now, when a client executes
multiple operations or opens multiple ﬁles at the same time, the ﬁle system
is neither linearizable nor sequentially consistent. For instance, execution
depicted at the top row in Figure 4.4(b) is admissible. Under close-to-open
semantics, linearizability is stricter than sequential consistency, which is itself
stricter than eventual consistency (last two rows in Figure 4.4(b)).
Consistency of the File System
A FSCL is obtained by the combination of a consistency level governing ﬁle
operations and the use or not of the close-to-open semantics. This leads to
six diﬀerent FSCLs. In Figure 4.4, we list in the last column one or more
matching implementations for each level.
POSIX semantics is obtained when ﬁle operations are atomic and close-
to-open is not supported. To implement sequential consistency, Sprite [96]
relies on a cache consistency manager while GoogleFS [51] and HDFS [45]
make use of a leasing mechanism. NFS [118] implements the consistency
level oﬀered in Andrew File System [61]: the close-to-open semantics is
respected and metadata operations are atomic. Sinfonia [4] supports mini-
transactions, a generalized form of compare-and-swap operation. To advocate
for this paradigm, the authors of Sinfonia built a ﬁle system: SinfoniaFS. This
ﬁle system implements sequential consistency with close-to-open semantics.
Ivy [93], and Pastis [16] implement an eventually consistent DFSS, respectively,
with and without close-to-open semantics. Busca et al. also present in [16] a
version of Pastis that supports read-your-write semantics.
4.5 Algorithms
In this section we present the diﬀerent algorithms used by FlexiFS. FUSE
operations are performed on the client, while the distributed storage layer
API and its three consistency models are handled by the key/value store.
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FUSE API with Close-to-Open (CTO) semantics
We present in this and the following subsection the algorithms followed by the
FlexiFS client when the system calls a FUSE operation (see Section 4.2). Only
the relevant operations and arguments are presented. For some operations,
the client performs a diﬀerent algorithm depending on whether it follows or
not CTO semantics. This subsection presents the case when using CTO. The
next subsection describes the diﬀerences in the algorithms when considering
atomic read/write operations instead of CTO semantics.
create(ﬁlename,mode): Upon the creation of a ﬁle, the client builds a cor-
responding iblock and sends it to the distributed storage. The argument
mode is copied into the corresponding ﬁeld in the metadata. The client
executes then a CAS on the parent directory to add the ﬁle. Performing
a CAS operation ensures that two clients cannot create the same ﬁle
concurrently. If the ﬁle was concurrently created, the operation returns
-1. If the CAS operation is successfully executed, the ﬁle is left open
for subsequent operations (i.e., the iblock is kept in memory, with an
open_sessions counter set to 1) and the function returns.
mkdir(ﬁlename): A “make directory” call is similar to a create operation,
but in this case, an iblock for directory is created. The directory is not
left open.
getattr(ﬁlename): The client requests the iblock that corresponds to the
ﬁle name given in the arguments. Then, it extracts a set of standard
attributes from the iblock and returns them. This attributes are described
in Section 4.2.
open(ﬁlename): To open an existing ﬁle, the client follows the structure of the
ﬁle system and invokes the get() operation to retrieve the corresponding
iblock from the storage interface. Once the iblock is fetched, the
client checks that permissions are correct. If so, the ﬁle is left open for
further operations, the open_sessions counter is incremented by 1, and
the function returns.
read(ﬁlename, iblock , size, oﬀset): A read operation is always preceded by
a open or create operation. Since the iblock is kept in memory and
provided as an argument, the client also knows all the dblocks attached
to it. To retrieve the content of the ﬁle, the client fetches the required
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dblocks from the storage system by invoking get() operations in parallel.
The arguments size and oﬀset help to calculate which iblocks are going
to be retrieved. The client then concatenates all these streams and returns
a single string of bytes.
write(ﬁlename, iblock , buﬀer , oﬀset): The client ﬁrst produces the new
dblocks. With the help of oﬀset, it calculates which blocks will be
overwritten. The client leverages the put() operation to insert (in parallel)
the new dblocks in the distributed storage. Notice that because dblocks
are content-addressed and immutable, every modiﬁcation that produces an
existing dblock leads to the creation of a new dblock with a diﬀerent key.
Then, the client updates the copy of the iblock that resides in memory
and returns the size of the written buﬀer.
flush(ﬁlename, iblock): The client sends the updated iblock to the dis-
tributed storage system.
release(ﬁlename, iblock): The client decrements the number of open sessions
in the iblock structure. If this counter reaches 0, the client proceeds to
close the ﬁle; it sends an updated version of the iblock to the distributed
storage.
rename(from, to): The client ﬁrst retrieves the iblocks of the from and to
parent directories. If the directories are the same, the client attempts to
update the iblock of the parent directory. In case they are diﬀerent, the
client ﬁrst tries adding the ﬁle to the target directory, then it attempts
removing the ﬁle from the source directory. To make atomic modiﬁca-
tions, the client retrieves an iblock with a get(), modiﬁes it locally, and
attempts to update it with a CAS.
If any of the CAS operations fails, the operation returns an error. Even
when CAS is atomic, the whole operation is not atomic; the renamed ﬁle
might end up in both source and target directories. Renaming shall be
strictly atomic in POSIX semantics. We note however that such behavior
is admissible in certain systems (e.g., Win32).
link(from, to): The client retrieves and modiﬁes the iblock representing
the parent directory of the new ﬁle (to), in order to add this entry. I also
retrieves the iblock that is pointed by from, and increments the ﬁeld
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nlinks (number of links) in it. Then it updates the iblock with a CAS.
Just like rename, this operation is not strictly atomic.
unlink(ﬁlename): The client retrieves the iblocks that correspond to ﬁle-
name and to its parent directory. It removes the entry from the parent
directory and updates it with a CAS. Then, it decrements the number of
links on the iblock; if this number reaches 0, it removes the iblock too
(and optionally also the dblocks).
symlink(from, to): The client creates an iblock and writes the string from
as the only element of the iblock, apart from the standard metadata.
The iblock has a special mode that indicates that it is a soft link. The
client puts the iblock on the distributed storage, and then, it attempts
then to update the parent directory with a CAS.
When the FlexiFS client implements the CTO semantics, it keeps track
of the open ﬁles. In other words, upon a successful call to open(f) the client
records the iblock of f . This iblock is used for all the operations during a
ﬁle session: a read() operation accesses the dblocks indexed by the iblock,
and a write operation changes only the cached version. When the client
closes ﬁle f , it stores the iblock of f using put(). It can then remove f from
memory.
FUSE API without CTO semantics
CTO semantics help to improve the eﬃciency of a ﬁle system by reducing
the number of accesses to the storage device(s) (synchronization with storage
occurs only when ﬂushing or releasing ﬁles). In the speciﬁc case of a DFSS,
it reduces the the number of put() and get() requests sent to the distributed
storage system. However, multi-user ﬁle systems that support concurrent read-
/write access from diﬀerent client nodes, will likely require atomic operations,
in order to provide POSIX-like guarantees (see Section 4.4).
The algorithms described in the previous subsection change when atomic
reads and writes are assumed. We depict here theses changes:
• The operations read and write discard the iblock that comes in the
arguments (which was retrieved during a previous open instruction).
These operations retrieve the iblock from the distributed storage system
with a get().
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FUSE ProxyFlexiFS Client
get(iblock)
open
read
get(dblock1)
get(dblock2)
get(dblock3)
write
put(dblock4)
put(dblock5)
release
With CTO Without CTO
put(iblock)
FUSE ProxyFlexiFS Client
get(iblock)
put(iblock)
get(iblock)
put(iblock)
get(iblock)
cas(iblock)
get(dblock1)
get(dblock2)
get(dblock3)
open
read
write
put(dblock4)
put(dblock5)
release
Figure 4.5: CTO semantics vs. atomic operations (The dark arrows represent
added messages, while the light arrows represent messages that are no longer needed).
• read and write operations update the corresponding iblock at the
end of their execution with the use of a put() and a cas(), respectively.
• The operations open and release are not necessary anymore, and
become empty functions.
• The open_sessions counter is not necessary anymore, since there is no
longer the concept of sessions.
Another way of seeing these diﬀerences is picturing that every read and
write operation are implicitly “enclosed” by an open and release operation.
These diﬀerences are shown in Figure 4.5. The dark arrows represent the mes-
sages that are added to atomic read/write operations, w.r.t. CTO semantics.
The light arrows are the messages that are not present when CTO semantics
are not used, because they are no longer needed.
When writing the iblock at the end of a write operation, the client uses
CAS to update the iblock corresponding to the ﬁle. If the iblock changed
meanwhile, the client has to recompute (if necessary) the dblocks, as well as
an updated version of the iblock; then it re-executes CAS. This last sequence
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of operations is executed until the CAS operation succeeds. Since a write
operation may access any oﬀset of the ﬁle, the above mechanism is necessary
to avoid a lost update phenomena when two clients concurrently write the
ﬁle.
A read operation also changes the iblock, because it modiﬁes the ﬁeld
atime. However, at the end of a read operation, there is a put() instead of a
cas(), because atime is always overwritten without taking into account the
previous value.
FSCLs and the distributed storage layer API
In Section 4.4 we discussed the 6 diﬀerent FSCLs that are supported by our
design, which are the result of 3 diﬀerent consistency levels in the distributed
storage layer, combined with the use or not of CTO semantics. We discussed
in the two previous subsections the technical details regarding the use of CTO.
Since CTO semantics are inherent to ﬁle handling, the diﬀerences between
the two approaches (with or without CTO) are present only on the client’s
algorithms.
On the other hand, the diﬀerences between the 3 consistency levels sup-
ported by FlexiFS are present on the Storage Node’s algorithms. We explain
below the algorithms for each of the consistency levels:
Linearizability: As explained in Section 4.4, a common way to achieve
linearizability is through consensus, with the use of Paxos. On top of such
consensus, we implement for FlexiFS a replicated state machine executing
the four operations listed in Section 4.3.
Sequential consistency: For this consistency level, we use primary replica-
tion. All put(k, v) calls are processed by the primary replica. To execute
cas(k, u, v), the primary replica tests locally if the old value equals u. If it
is the case, it executes a put(k, v) and returns the old value to the Proxy.
To execute a get(k) call, the Proxy accesses any replica of k that contains
the version it previously read, or a newer version.
Eventual consistency: We implement eventual consistency in FlexiFS us-
ing vector clocks (see Section 4.2) and the “last writer wins” approach [108].
This optimistic replication schema works as follows: Each version of a
< k, v > record is timestamped with a vector clock. Upon updating
the value of a record (via put() or cas()), the Proxy contacts one of the
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replicas responsible for this record. This replica atomically increments its
local vector clock, timestamps the record with it, and returns to the Proxy.
Replicas then converge using an anti-entropy protocol. If two versions
of some record are concurrent, we apply the “last writer wins” approach.
Concurrent operations are totally ordered according to the identiﬁer of
the replicas that emitted them. Upon a get() operation, the Proxy simply
returns a version stored at any of the replicas.
Also, these algorithms apply only when accessing iblocks. All dblocks
are immutable, and thus, they are trivially linearizable. To improve per-
formance, access to dblocks, in any of the 3 consistency levels, follows a
simpler algorithm: put() and get() operations access a majority of replicas,
respectively storing and fetching the content from it.
4.6 Implementation and Deployment
FlexiFS’ implementation is built upon SPLAY [82], and it constitutes at the
same time an enhancement to the platform’s features. The implementation is
separated in two parts: the Storage Node’s code, and the client’s code.
The Storage Nodes
The Storage Node’s code is implemented as two SPLAY libraries, that can
be loaded by any job running on the platform. The libraries are paxos.lua,
which spans around 200 Source Lines of Code (SLOC), and distdb.lua
(around 1000 SLOC).
The paxos.lua library contains the functions paxos_read and
paxos_write. These functions allow operating a Paxos run between sev-
eral nodes.
The function paxos_read receives the following arguments:
• An array of nodes, each node described as pair < IP_address , port >.
• A unique and consistently increasing proposal ID.
• Number of retries. When this number of retries is depleted, the function
stops and returns on error.
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The function paxos_write receives the same arguments as paxos_read,
in addition to the value to be proposed.
Both functions perform Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) over UDP to
all the nodes in the array and follow the Basic Paxos algorithm. The read
function returns the latest stored value (agreed on consensus). For the write
function, the proposed value is stored if consensus is reached (i.e., if the
majority of nodes commit to store the new value). If the proposal does not
get enough quorum before a given timeout, or if any node indicates that it has
already committed to a bigger proposal ID, the process is repeated. Timeouts
are attributes of the library calls, and can be tuned to ﬁt the developer’s
needs.
The library can be used independently of FlexiFS, e.g., as base for an
agreement protocol [15, 63].
The distdb.lua library contains the complete functionality of a Storage
Node, including the functionality related to the Proxy role: a lightweight
HTTP server to communicate with clients through a RESTful API, and the
forwarding functions for the DHT API.
The client
The client’s code is a set of Lua scripts that are loaded in the client premises,
independently of the execution of SPLAY. It does not use any of the SPLAY
libraries. It leverages instead the FUSE C library and a Lua binding to this
library from the luafuse project [85].
The client side is composed of two ﬁles: distdb-client.lua (163 SLOC) and
ﬂexifs-client.lua (621 SLOC). The former contains functions that communicate
with the Proxy’s RESTful API, and the latter contains all the FUSE logic.
4.7 Evaluation
In this section, we present experimental results obtained using FlexiFS,
where we observe empirically and in isolation the trade-oﬀs between sharing
semantics and performance in DFSS designs.
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Figure 4.6: Evaluating consistency at the key/value store level (LIN, SC and
EC stand for Linearizable, Strong Consistency and Eventual Consistency models,
respectively).
Experimental Settings
All tests were performed on a cluster of 8-core virtualized Xeon 2.5 Ghz servers
running Ubuntu 12.04 GNU/Linux and connected by a 1 Gbps switched net-
work. We use 3 to 7 servers for the storage layer and one client. Our
implementation uses the Lua [65] language and leverages the SPLAY [82]
framework and libraries. Bindings to the FUSE C API employ the luafuse
library (http://code.google.com/p/luafuse/). The FlexiFS implementa-
tion is modular and easy to modify. The conciseness of Lua and the use of
SPLAY allow the whole implementation to be less then 2,000 lines of code
(LOC). In particular, the code to support each FSCL is very concise and easy
to extend, e.g., 62 LOC for sequential consistency, and 160 LOC for eventual
consistency.
In what follows, we explore the impact of each FSCL on the cost of
iblock operations, and ﬁle operations. We also investigate the impact of the
replication factor on performance. All experimental results are averaged over
103 operations, and we present standard deviations when appropriate. During
our experiments, the size of a dblock was set to 128 kB.
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Figure 4.7: Evaluating FSCLs and the Replication Factor by writing a ﬁle (CTO
stands for close-to-open semantics).
Benchmarks
Metadata Operations. In Figure 4.6(a), we experiment the insertion of
a novel iblock in the storage system when both the FSCL and the size of
the inserted block vary. For the sake of comparison, results are normalized
by the time required for executing a dummy RPC carrying a payload that
equals the size of the block.
We observe in Figure 4.6(a) that eventual consistency is the cheapest
FSCL as it costs around 2 times more than the baseline RPC call. This is
expected since a call to CAS under eventual consistency requires 2 roundtrips:
one to go from the client to the Proxy, then one to go from the Proxy to
a replica. Sequential consistency costs 4 roundtrips: Once the primary is
reached, the update must reach a quorum of replicas. For linearizability, 2
more roundtrips for the “propose” phase of the Paxos algorithm are executed,
leading to 6 times the baseline cost.
Our second experiment evaluates the cost of fetching an iblock from the
ﬁle storage. We report the results in Figure 4.6(b). Under linearizability, a
get() operation has an identical cost to a CAS operation, since both operations
go through the replicated state machine. On the other hand, the cost of
sequential consistency is reduced because the Proxy can access any replica to
fetch the iblock content. Therefore, performance is in that case identical to
eventual consistency.
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File Operations. Figure 4.7(a) depicts the time required to write a com-
plete ﬁle at the client side using the FUSE interface. Both scales in this
ﬁgure are logarithmic. Eventual consistency is the fastest FSCL when either
(i) close-to-open semantics is not used, or (ii) there is a single dblock to
write, i.e., less than 128 kB in our settings. The POSIX semantics of sharing
(i.e., linearizability without close-to-open semantics) performs the worst in
this respect. When the size of the ﬁle reaches 128 kB, the use of close-to-open
semantics leads to better performance (between 2 and 3 times faster). Below
128 kB, close-to-open semantics pays the cost of the necessary open() and
close() operations. All FSCLs oﬀering close-to-open semantics reach similar
performance when more than 4 MB of data are written. Read operations over
a ﬁle (not reported here) follow a similar pattern.
Impact of the Replication Factor. Our last experiment measures the
impact of the replication factor on performance. In this experiment, a client
writes a ﬁle of 4 MB under linearizability. We vary both the replication factor
of FlexiFS, and the use or not of the close-to-open semantics. Figure 4.7(b)
depicts our results. In this ﬁgure, we observe that increasing the replication
factor has a small impact on performance: below 3% without close-to-open
semantics, and 7% with. Paxos is the most demanding consistency control
algorithm we have implemented. Thus, this result shows that the FSCL is
contributing more than the replication factor to the DFSS performance.
4.8 Related work
Several papers discuss the performance, consistency, and semantics trade-oﬀs
in DFSS designs. The Andrew ﬁle system (AFS) [61] introduced caching
mechanisms and the close-to-open semantics for both ﬁles and directories.
This was inspired by earlier designs such as LOCUS [126], which relied on a
strict—but costly and ineﬃcient—POSIX semantics. Since its second version,
the Network File System (NFS) [118] also implements the close-to-open
semantics; its fourth version distinguishes data from metadata management.
OceanStore [73] is a ﬂat data storage system that provides both eventually
consistent and atomic operations. OceanStore follows a design close to the
eventually serializable data storage [41]. In OceanStore, an application may
emit two types of ﬁle operations: a weak operation is tentative and executes
on any replica; a strong operation waits until replicas agree on some total
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ordering of the operations.
GoogleFS [51] uses a central server for storing metadata. CFS [31] builds
a single-user ﬁle system by storing content-addressable blocks in the Chord
DHT [115]. Ivy [93] extends this design by allowing a predeﬁned group of
users to access a shared ﬁle system. Content blocks are stored in the Chord
DHT and each writer maintains its own modiﬁcation log, implementing
read-your-write semantics and eventual consistency.
Stamatakis et al. [114] propose to build centralized metadata storage
services for DFSS, providing linearizability guarantees using the Paxos [77]
consensus algorithm while maintaining high availability.
The authors of Pastis [16] compare the close-to-open against the read-
your-write semantics. Levy [83] surveys DFS designs and four diﬀerent
types of ﬁle sharing semantics: POSIX, close-to-open, immutable ﬁles, fully
transactional semantics, and survey corresponding implementations. The
use of a modular framework for evaluating design choices and establishing
performance/trade-oﬀs in systems software design has been successfully used
in various domains. Examples include virtual machines construction [50] or
CORBA-based Middleware [101].
4.9 Summary
This chapter depicted a study of the impact of the FSCL on the performance
of a DFSS. While the FSCL oﬀered by a DFSS has fundamental impact on
performance, it is diﬃcult to systematically evaluate this impact in isolation
from other design aspects, due to the design and implementation diversity of
existing systems. In this chapter, we have presented FlexiFS, a framework for
the systematic evaluation of DFSS aspects. In more details, we have depicted
a ﬁle system interface to users and leverage a set of servers implementing a
fully distributed storage layer for both data and metadata. We implemented
three forms of consistency: linearizability, sequential consistency and eventual
consistency, together with and without close-to-open semantics. Remarkably,
a DFSS providing all these FSCL can be supported with the simple addition
of a compare-and-swap primitive to a regular key/value store.
Our experimental results establish that linearizability under the close-to-
open semantics is a sound design choice and a good compromise between
operational semantics and performance, while illustrating the trade-oﬀs oﬀered
by the other design options.
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We have shown in the introduction that computing is nowadays advancing
towards new trends:
• There is an increasing tendency to virtualization and resource sharing
(CPU power, memory, storage).
• Large-scale internet services tend to scale out instead of scaling up.
• More and more small devices (e.g., sensors) are connected to the internet
and provide big amounts of new data.
These trends lead many concerns about privacy, speciﬁcally anonymity,
and trust, which become important topics more than ever. A big part of
this thesis is dedicated to mitigate issues about anonymity and trust. The
other important aspect covered by this thesis is the creation of tools for the
evaluation of new paradigms in large-scale distributed storage.
To conclude, we sum our contributions in Section 5.1, followed by Sec-
tion 5.2, where we present scenarios that can combine the three systems.
Finally, we present in Section 5.3 several perspectives that our work opens to
the research community.
5.1 Contributions
During the realization of this thesis, we have accomplished to create three
systems, which solve critical problems encountered on our study of Large-Scale
Distributed Storage Systems (LS-DSSs).
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First we focused on LS-DSSs and how they can guarantee publisher
anonymization and rate limitation at the same time. We designed and
implemented SPADS: Publisher Anonymization for DHT Storage [43], which
deals with both aspects. Publisher anonymity is guaranteed by the use of
Chaum mixes, while rate limitation is enforced by a credential management
protocol. We evaluated the system using a real implementation, and we
observed that it is applicable.
Then, we focused on Large-Scale Distributed Aggregation Systems (LS-
DASs) and how they can detect suspicious behavior from malevolent nodes. We
designed and implemented Collaborative Auditing for Distributed Aggregation
(CADA) [120], which consists in two decentralized and lightweight oracles,
which detect servers that attempt to bias the aggregation. The oracles
perform a probabilistic auditing, that raises suspicions based on the statistical
deviation from an expected behavior. CADA is intended to provide an
input for an external mechanism (e.g., blacklist management service, trust
management layer).
Finally, we focused on Distributed File Storage Services (DFSSs) and the
lack of a fair benchmarking platform for important settings like the consistency
model or the replication factor. We designed and implemented FlexiFS [121],
a testbed DFSS that allows a clean comparison of consistency models and
their impact on the system’s performance.
FlexiFS allows an end-user to mount a Linux ﬁle system with the help of
File System in User Space (FUSE), on top of a key/value store that oﬀers a
traditional Application Programming Interface (API) with the addition of the
compare-and-swap primitive. FlexiFS is modular, and leverages several state-
of-the-art mechanisms for data distribution, replication, routing, and indexing.
We benchmarked the six diﬀerent File System Consistency Levels (FSCLs)
oﬀered by the system and concluded that linearizability and the use of close-to-
open semantics is a good combination and a gives a good compromise between
operational semantics and performance. We also exposed the trade-oﬀs oﬀered
by the other design options.
5.2 Integration of the three systems
In this section, we show scenarios were we can combine the three systems
developed during this thesis (SPADS, CADA and FlexiFS).
The ﬁrst scenario is mentioned as a key motivation of the thesis (Sec-
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Figure 5.1: Buzzaar general architecture with SPADS for anonymization and rate
limitation and CADA for collaborative auditing.
tion 1.2). The Buzzaar project is an LS-DAS built upon a multi-domain
network, which is based on several smaller networks from diﬀerent cloud
computing providers.
The “multi-domain” condition puts constrains on trust, such as the impos-
sibility of trusting a single server of not biasing aggregations or not wanting
to disclose identiﬁable information of the clients.
The second constraint raises the need to provide system-wide guarantees
that the information will remain anonymous, but this poses the threat that
malicious clients will want to bias the aggregations and take advantage of
their guaranteed anonymity.
Finally, in an LS-DAS, we want to avoid as much as possible the presence
of centralized entities that diminish the scalability of the network.
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So, we want for Buzzaar, a system or combination of systems that provide:
• publisher anonymization,
• rate-limitation, and
• collaborative auditing.
By mixing the mechanisms provided by SPADS and CADA, we can provide
such features to Buzzaar and similar LS-DASs. Figure 5.1 shows a high level
picture of Buzzaar, functioning with the two aforementioned systems.
An important use of such systems can be in privacy-preserving social
networks, which might want to perform data mining on their clients contents,
while guaranteeing their anonymity.
Another possible scenario is a DFSS that wants to provide several FSCLs
according to diﬀerent Service-Level Agreements (SLAs) established with its
clients. This DFSS wants to provide system-wide anonymity guarantees, but
at the same time, wants to limit the update rate and/or the storage quota
of its clients. Data in dblocks can be encrypted or not by the client before
storage, with a secret symmetric key that only the client knows.
In order to provide a full set of anonymous operations, we must provide
also an anonymous get. Such operation can simply use the onion routing
scheme described in Section 2.2, where a return path is encoded along the
message.
For such system, we want to provide:
• publisher anonymization.
• rate-limitation.
• conﬁgurable FSCL.
A combination of SPADS and FlexiFS provides the desired features.
Notice that the use of FlexiFS, with its simple algorithms for failure-handling
and Key-Based Routing (KBR), is oriented rather to prototyping or the
development of proof-of-concept systems. This is shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Architecture of a DFSS with SPADS for anonymization and rate
limitation and FlexiFS for tunable FSCL.
Integration of the three systems Finally, we can picture the above
scenario, and add the possibility of performing data mining tasks over the
data that clients store. Examples of data mining can be the extraction of
keywords out of ﬁle names, text on documents. Aggregations that result from
data mining and gathering of statistics can be stored in an LS-DAS, that can
be based on a second distributed storage layer, or leverage the same as the
DFSS.
Data mining can be performed on the server side, over each block that
is handled. For this case, data must be stored without encryption. If data
mining is done rather on the client side, this restriction is no longer necessary.
Assuming that the LS-DAS requires protection of its aggregations from
byzantine behaviors, and, as a large-scale system, it is not desirable to depend
on a central entity that handles all the auditing, we can leverage CADA to
provide collaborative auditing.
Figure 5.3 shows the integration of the three systems, with a common
SPADS layer, and then FlexiFS and CADA, for storage of the client’s data
and statistics on the client’s data, respectively.
5.3 Perspectives
Our work on the three systems presented in Section 5.1 leads to several
perspectives, that we discuss in this section.
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Figure 5.3: Integration of the three systems.
Many perspectives are opened by the development of SPADS. First, it
would be interesting to study the possibility of replacing the centralized
authentication authority with a decentralized implementation of the same
service. Trust-based network could be a sound approach for this, but the
mechanisms shall be made resilient to Sybil attacks [37], which is not an easy
task. Second, even if rate limitation greatly reduces the impact of cheating
peers, it does not totally prevent them from sending a small amount of fake
data to the system. It would be interesting to investigate the possibility for
servers to collaboratively blacklist cheaters without compromising anonymiza-
tion. Note that, similarly to rate limitation vs. publisher anonymization,
these two objectives appear to be contradictory and supporting both is a
challenging problem.
Our work on CADA oracles opens interesting perspectives. First, the
oracles can automatically purge the information originated by misbehaving
servers (as identiﬁed by their number of suspicions). Since the distribution of
elements coming from servers that are deemed safe follows the same trend,
the distribution with no bias can be built by interpolating the distributions
from safe servers (or from shadow servers in the case of aggregation biasing).
This results in an additional disincentive for servers to bias the aggregation:
their contributions may simply be ignored silently.
Another future work on the topic could be to focus on relaxing the entry
points uniform distribution hypothesis, allowing the insertion bias oracle to
support any load distribution at the Forwarding Point (FP) level, other than
the uniform distribution. This approach is feasible only if the distribution of
FPs contributions is known in advance; a way to achieve that is to collectively
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build a model of the distribution, based on observations made by other servers
in the aggregation layer, and provide it as an input to the insertion bias
oracle. It would also be desirable to consider the pairing of the oracles with a
reputation management mechanism, in which the signed suspicions reports
by the servers are used to build the reputation of servers and enforce trust
metrics.
Finally, our work on FlexiFS opens perspectives in the ﬁeld of DFSS design.
We plan on investigating further aspects of DFSS pertaining to indexing, client
interaction, and semantics. FlexiFS oﬀers currently six diﬀerent ﬂavors of
FSCLs, but many more can be added, e.g., by implementing more replication
schemes on the key/value store. Further experimentation regarding the
benchmark of FSCLs can be done, by performing tests with concurrent clients
and with servers leaving and entering the network (churn). We can, in fact,
leverage SPLAY’s churn manager to simulate complex churn schemes. We also
plan to release FlexiFS as a part of the open-source SPLAY framework [82].
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